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INTRODUOTION 
There will always be some question as to how the writings 
of Ortega y Gasset Should be c1assitied. Thus tar his work has 
been variously designed as philosophical, political, esthetic, 
humanist. Ortega considered himselt aa intellectual. l At the 
begInning ot his lIterary career he was fond of the name The 
Spectator, and he himselt detines for us the meaning of this 
name: "The spectator has, consequently, a primary purpose: to 
raise a bastion against politics for myself and for those who 
share my desire for pure vision and for theory-.ft2 
Nevertheless, the name Spectator could have been interpret. 
ed as a camouflage for a marked political tendency at the begin-
ning of t he twentieth century. Ortega founded tm Lea~ue !:!!. !!!:. 
ucation "to study in detail spaniSh life and to closely scrutin-
ize Spaniah society by means of propaganda, critiCism, defense, 
protest and the organs ot education, economics and techno1ogYe .. 3 
The role that he played in the •• tab118hment ot the Republio and 
lort.ga y Gasset, La rebe1ion de las masas (Madrid, 1958), 
p.18. - --
• 2Ortega, ItEl A8pAc-'t4ildor," Obras Comp1etas, II (Madrid, 1954) 17. - -
'orte"ga, "Vie ja y nueva poli tica, n Obras Comp1etaa, I (Ma-
d:rd.d, 1953), 305. 
2 
later his tenure of office as deputy of Leon, as indications of 
his marked interest in politics, despite the fact that he did 
not wiSh to enter any party. Nevertheles8, it could be disput-
ed to What extent he really maintained an interest in politics. 
Be that as it may. his work gives .a prominent place '/:,IC political 
writings such as: Vieja 1. nueva politica. E!2ana invertebrad., 
and above all, !!. rebel!:oD ~ !!! masas.4 
None of the principal critics and commentators ot Ortega 
hal denied him the nama of philosopher. But this word is under-
stood in ~oh a wide aen •• that it doee not add anything to the 
name intellectual. When we restrict the sense of the wotct phil-
and apply it to Ortega, we find ourselve. in the midst of a he.t-
ed and interminable polemiC among many critic. ot Ortega, a real 
"intellectual intrigue."5 
All tho commentators ot Ortega pre.ent What we could call 
a systematization ot hi. thought. Por ortega was not .... and on 
this all agree--a 81ltematic thinker. Be waa tempted, several 
time., to write his basic philosophical posItions in a more 
schematic tor.a. But he never did 10. 
40bras Completas, IV (Madrid, 1955), 113-312, II (Madrid 
1953), 3'7-l31' 1 (Hartd, 1953), 265-307, respectively. ' 
5Julian Marias, Ort.g~! tree antipodas (Madrid, 1,,,) 
and the article, "Intrlga InteIiCtua! contra Ortega'" 
Razon y Fe, CXLIII (1951), 568-591. 
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Althougb artega accepted various Qhalrs ot philoaopbJ--
one at the unlverll1ty of Madrid and several in Latin America 
Uhiveraitie.--in his classes and writings he lost himselt in 
uselesa esthetical digressions. The speotator has overrun the 
philoaopher. 
Bowever, the tact that Ortega was an aoaompliabedassayist 
adds little to our disousaion exoept that he excelled in thia 
literary tom, for he did write literary, philosophiesl, ~d.s­
torical eaaay. ot all typea. From this wealth or literary out-
put one atill oan legitimately gather a philoaopbJ and a politi-
cal doctrine. The writer does not intend to overlook what haa 
been sald 80 tar about the whole work ot ortega. BUt the sole 
intention at the moment, is to of tel' a new point of view .ot hi. 
work. the point of view ot .oaiolog. 
There are a number ot works Which indicate a sociology in 
Ortega. The most outstanding of all is SOciolos1a Z politica 
!!!. Orte§a l. Gas.et EI.jferhal'l. d_-Rubio. 6 To appreciate the nature 
of this work, the term sociology as well as the term political 
soienoe must be understood in the European aen..atill prevail-
ing in countries like Spain. In reality, this book of Hernan-
dea-Rubio is nothing more than a treat! .. on poiitical and soci-
al philosapby. 
The writer oan ofte# two main reasons tor a systematic ap-
proach to the soci logy of Ortega. 'rhe tirst is that his phil-
6(Baroelona, 1956). 
4 
osoph1eal conclusions are not formulated in an abstract, pure. 
ly philosophIcal manner innaoesaible to empirical verilication. 
And secondly, if one as 80me critics do, decide. to deny that 
ortega is a philosopher 1n the strict sense of the word, then 
the majority of his ideas are nothing more than scientifio pre-
positions, some verified, others to be verified. Let us hear 
the authorities in this matter. Ferrater Mora says: "The phil-
osophy of Ortega is extraordinaril7 difficult to olassiff be. 
cause our writer 1s one of the few who in modern history have 
pointed up the problematic oharaoter of philosophical activity/7 
And Rubio Hernandez: "His whole phllosophy Is troubled with a 
lack of roots.tt 8 It is pessible"--these are the wOI'de of Iriarte 
-."that what 1s gold in the field of humanism and mental apti-
tude, may be olay in the realm of ph!losophy."9 
It, on the oontrary, one would agree with Jullan Marias 
who olassifie. ortega as "the greatest philosopher which Spain 
has had sinoe sunrez,n10still one would be justified in intra-
7La fl1080£1. de Ortega y Gallet (Buenos Aires, 1958),p. 9. 
- - ----
8SOo101og1a y politica en Ortega y Gallet (Barcelona, 1956), 
P.l..4.. - - - . 
9La rut. mental de Ortega (Madrid, 1949). p. 6. 
lOphllosopher espaeo1s .2! notre te!ps (Par!e, 195!d, p. 65. 
5 
duc1ng into the f1eld of soc1010gy those statements of ortega 
whieb are open to empirical verification. In this case, ortega 
should be con.sidered as a philosopher who has made oontributions 
to the rield of soc1010gy just as did Hegel, Dilthey, Scheler, 
Marx, eto.ll 
For many reasons, however, which will be pointed out in 
the present work, the writer believes that Ortega'. contribution 
to sociology cannot be considered merely in this wide sense. 
Vfuil. authors of "grand theo~1n and metasociologists are t~eat-
I ~ i . ;, 
ed iq books of sociolog~eal theory, there seems to be no reason 
why ~le work of Ortega ~08e 800ial doctrine is empirically re-
( L 
. ~ lev~t, should be exolu~ed • 
. ~ 
The argument in deiJense of this thesis will appear in the 
.1 
\ 
first chapter which wU~ constitute the main proof, and, so to 
" ~
speak, the major of the syllogism of the thesis. In this chap-
ter we will discuss the requirements which the works of Ortega, 
or anybody else, for this matter, ought to have to merit being 
called sooiological. This will depend on our definition and 
ooncept of sooiology and its limits. The rest of the thesis 
will be like the minor ot the s.yllogism. In ,it one will be 
able to Observe how ortega fulfill" the requ.irements set forth 1n 
flr.t chapter. 
llAs an example of what is meant here t se. Merton's Social Theot;l: ~ Sooial structure (Glenooe, 1959Jt pp. 456-489-
6 
Before beginning the main burden of this thesis a few facts 
of the life of ortega are in place. Jose Ortega. y Gassetws.s 
born in Madrid in May of 1883. Consequently, he belonged, at 
least chronologically, to the generation of writers who contem-
plated the final collapse of the Spanish colonial empire in 1898 
and dedicated themselves to mourning the death of spain. "The 
rebellion of the masses," says Ortega," and the radical demor-
alization of humanity is one and the srune thlng. tt12 The genera-
_ ....... _--
!!.2!! 9£ 2,2§, as it has been named, is a groUp of gloomy writ-
ers whose historical mission, according to them, is to stimulate 
the people of their generation doomed to 80cial and political 
disalter. 
Ortega was born in a house of wri terse His father was the 
editor of the publication, !! Imparcia1, a daily newspaper to 
which Ortega would later contribute articles. He studied in the 
boarding school of the Jesuits of' Miraflores del Prado, but later 
he aband~ned the faith, attac~d the Church and especially the 
Jesu.its. 1 3 In 1904, he received his doctorate of philosophy snd 
humanities in Madrid. Afterwards, he carried on the studies in 
Germany, and the influence; of the German 11.fer made a gr&at 1m-
,I:. 
I2La rebelion de la s masas (Madrid, 195·8). p. 109 _ I __ ...... __ _ 
l30ne of his most; bitter articles against the Jesuits is 
"AI margen del libro 'A • .M.D.G." ObI"8.s Completaa, I (Madrid, 1953) 
532-535. 
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pression on him. He says, "There is a lIght haired German, med-
itative and sentimental, WQo breathes in the twilight ot my 
soul. tt 14 He took courses in tre universities ot Leipzig, Berlin, 
and Marburg. Among his teachers he wa~ especially intluenced by 
Cohen, his master, and Diltbey. FUrthermore, there was bis Bre. 
-
tano, his lJietzsche, his Rickert, Buckle, Gobineau, Spengler, 
and such historians as Renan, Momsen, Ranke, and Hostovett.15 
The identification wi t}] Germany in the early years of his 
career was blended with the influenoe of Bergson, Michelet, 
Descartes, Marianne, and many o't.t'1er ph1.losophers. 
He returned to Spain with the mission to Europeanize it. He 
edited the periodical El Faro, in Which he dedicated himselt to 
--
the dl.ftus"on. of the doctrines of t he Great European socio10-
. , -;-; ~ 
gist. and ph~10sopher8. In 1910 at the age of 27, Ortega took 
-!:;he chair of' Metaphysics at the Universldad Central de Madri,d. 
On March 2" 1914, l~ made his gradlose appearance in the pub-
lic lite of Spain .. '11th a speech in the ~j;t:no ~ .!!. Comedia ~ 
Madrid • 
ll~otras C~letas de Ortesa I Gaseet (Madrid. 1936), p. 44, 
cited in Jose ~chez VI!lasenor, Jose Ortega Z Gasset (Mexico. 
1943), p. 1~. 
15T1me" October, 31 (1955), p. 22. 
8 
In his flJeech, "Vieja 1. nueva poli tica, he denounced the evils 
of the monarchy, the reg.nor' an d the restON tion, and he present-
ed the program of the Liga ~ educacion Eolitica espanala.16 .A. 
an official organ of his teague of Political Education,a daily 
paper called Espana. was published .by him wi th A. Nessi and 
BaroJa. His main purpose was to create a new intellectual at-
mosphere and to stimulate the great 'vvriters of the time. In 
1917, he pl.lblishe d the review, El sol, with Niool and Urgoi ti 
--
in Al"gent ina. lie returned to Madrid and organized the famous 
Revista de occidente. Time called it tithe most widely quoted 
-
Spanish revlew. n17 He took a.n active part in the ove::-throw of 
tM monarchy through the Association para .!! servicio en .!! !!.:. 
2ubliOa.. "Spaniards," he said at this time,H our country does 
not exi~t, rebuild it. The monarchy must destroy itself.nlS 
In 1931, he was elected deputy to Cong;ress. "The magnificent mo-
ment has arrived wben fate has imposed upon the Spaniards the 
:right£'; to act gl"sndlosely." said ortega saluting the new Republlc}9 
160bras Complete.s, Ortega y Gasset, Jose, I (Madrid, 1953), 
265 ... 308. . 
17T1me (January 17. 1949), p. 45. 
18..r1me (October 31. 1955), p. 24. 
-
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With the onset of the oivil war in 1900, he fled to Franee 
lIead and sour.u20 Ooncerning his 1"01$ in the civil war, Iriarte 
saya: "Let us not make one who was present in the revolution, its 
author. There has been exaggeration in this Despec.t.n2l 
Franco wanted to nominat e hlm the offie ial philosopher of his 
movement a.t; the end of the waf:" providing he would change certain 
line s of his thought. Ortega fIa tly refused~ as migllt be expect. 
ed and in so doing condenmed himself to be a voluntary exile of 
twelve years in France and Sou.th t\l'Mrica. His return to Spa.:i.n 
in 1949, was noted in the preas of the world over. !lIn times ot 
great p1. ssion the duty of the intellectual is to remain qulet, for 
in times of great passion one must lie, and the intellectual does 
not have the right to speak 1.U1truth.,,22 He retired from. all ac-
tivity that could associa.te him with the govemm.nt. Tha.t same 
year (1949), he attended a oongress on the centenary ot' Goethe 
and presented a paper in Aspen; • Colorado. Much could be sal d 
about this event and his a.ttitude towards the English-speaking 
oountries, but his seclusion and his ideas with respect to fu"'l1eri-
20Tilll8 (October 31, 1955), p. 2,. 
----- , 
2lIriarte. "Ortega en au vivir y pensar," RaZOD I. Fe (1956), 
pp.344-;57; also ot. Jose Sa.nohez Villasenor, Jose or~eii' y Oasset 
(Mexico, 194;), pp. 11 ... 21; and Julian Marias, 151lIIosophes e!pan-
~oies de notre tem}.! (paris, 1954), pp. 65-76; and Penuel Grana1l, 
r ega-Y su f110so la (Madrid, 1960), pp. 1;-22. 
220n this point, see Iriarte's artiole "ortega f 1a dimension 
ang1osajona de au ptmsamiento,tt Raz0I;' l. !!. (1949), p. 344. 
10 
can demooracy prevented him from reviving a universal. acc1runation. 
The Revolt of the Masses was a best seller in the United states. 
- --
Ortega died of cancer on October 19. 1955, in Macrid. Ac-
cording to his wife he died. a Christian death. 23 CUrtius praised 
him highly and gave him the priority of thought which it was sup-
posed would go to Helde~8er or Jaspers. Niedemayer called him a 
rival of Heidegger. 24 
2~1me (October 31, 1955), p. 22. 
- ' 
24Iriarte. f! ~ mental ~ Ortega (Madrid, 1949), p. 33. 
CHAPTER I 
ORrEGA yctASSET: THE SOCIOLOGIST 
!!:!. approaoh 2!. Jullan Marlas fCJd th~ I?resent.!2.!:!. The philoso-
phlcal thought of Ortega., Gasset has been syatematlz.d by Julian 
Marias. )(arlas had one main purpOSu in pel'.form1ng this _""loe 
tor philosophersJ to reorgani,e the various essays of ortega a-
round salient Id.as and pl-oblems rather than around the origlnal 
but dlsoonne cted topios wh1,ch insplred them. The wrlter has a 
s~llar purpose in the SJstematlzat10n ot Ortega'8 soc1010gy. 
namely. to pre.ent his ideas In terms familiar to sociologlst8, 
and to reorientate his works around problems of sociologlcal 
signiflcanoe. 
Or tela c.!!Lb.!....conatd.l'ed a.!.,.sooiolo§lat. Ortega's extensive treat-
ment of sooial realitl •• covers their cultural and Ideologloal 
aspeots as well as their politlcal implicatlon.. As we will .e. 
his studle. are often In agr.ement with the Ideas ot oontempora1"3' 
sociologlst IJ but at times, he disagrees emphatlcall,.. Hi8 mon 
P1ean1ngtul sooiologloal works have dealt with the nature of 8001al 
~aots and wi'lh tile origin ot the power element in sooiety.1 Prom 
nis idea. on the.e two elemants ot sooi.ty he .formed a g.neral 
INi<bolas s. Timasheff, Soc1010g10al ~!'l (.ew Yolk, 1957) 
PP. q7-99. 
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theal. similar to Paretots oirculation at the elites.2 The strug-
gle between majori*" am minori ty grOUPI, which is a l,-nthe.ls 
of Toennittl and Pareto, determines all soclal changes, and con-
stitute. a general theory aimilar to the 'WOrka of Sorokln,Marx, , 
an~ DanllevlIJq. 
~le it is true that Ortega f • literary expre.lion 1a lome-
what ambiguous, the, thought conveyed by it is unified. Usill8 aa 
a starting point hi. general theory of the 800io1087 of knowledge 
about the s oclal. implication of ideologies, he talcl •• D1S.D'1 of the 
q~estions that occupy the mind of 80C iologists today. ae appll •• 
his tlle aries to :such problema as waa, progress and decadence" and 
:tnternationa1iara. He 81ao gives a prominent place to methodolog-
ical disou •• iona,-as for example, in the situation and value or 
the moral solenc •• , a term borrowed from Weger whO" work. Ortega 
partially translated into Spanish.' 
In one of his las t essays, !! hOllb~ I !! sent,e, he treat. 
the whole problem of *>oia1 facts and their realit,.. In this 
work, he infcrma us W the moving ooncem that inspired him, in 
hi. earl,. ,.ear., to read the works of the f !rst sociologist 11.3 Be 
tells us the great wonder tbat was stlrred in him by the fact that 
no one had devoted muoh time to formulating an aoourate dfd'1n1t1on 
of s octety. O:rtega un dertake s the task hlmsel..f an d flnal1,. ar-
2Ibld., p_ 163. 
30rtega, Man sin~.reO;li4 Tatlslated from ,Spanish into Engllsh 
by Wlllard R. 1ra .w a • 1957), pp. 178-179. 
12 
rIves at his own definition. 
In general, historicism, the oulturo-soclal approach to 
society and the doctrine of the point ~!!!!, are the main ideas 
whioh stimulated Ortega to stress the immediate empirioal aspe"t 
of socialfacta.4 
~eroble~ ~ systematization. One of the first difficulties en-
countered with the sociologioal thought· of Ortega y Gasset, and, 
therefore,the main prOblem of this thesis, is the laok of system-
atizatiop. Lest one fall into a rather mean!ngless disoussion 
of generalities. one must have clear ideas about what constitute. 
sociology. Does one mean by sociology a systematio approach to 
social facts that involves methodological tools and empirical 
verification? The. t the works of most sociolo~ists are orderly 
, 
and methodical and. aimed at a definite scientifIc purpose cannot 
be tioubted. yet ir one were tQrestrict the notion of socioloQ 
to the ststematic treatment of societ,y, one should be unneces8arl 
11' limiting the soope or the science. On the othor hand, a pure :". 
nominal definition of sociology would be equally inadequate. For 
it would not help tne discussion to say that 800io181' is whatever 
1& oontained 1n books bearing such a tltle.5 
. . 
But there 1s a prior question to be asked wijh T.~gard to 
this point: just how explicit .should be the syste'=latio treatm.n~ 
4:rurtey, The Soope and Method of sociol.oll (New York. 1953). 
p. 19 -- - -- -
5IbId., p. 303. 
1, 
and methodology of an author' Comte, Durkhe~, and weber dress-
ed thel~ thought In a style that more closely resembles phlloso-
phy than any ot the natural scienoes. Wlthin the realm ot phl1-
osophy, the novels and plays of people 11ke sartre and Camus are 
aooepted by philosophers as oontributions to their field. But 
in the field of the natural Bciences no work is aooepted unless 
it is systematlzed and contains a method. The soientifio orit 
eria tor sociology should be as independent ot the or1terl't tor 
philosophy as it should be independent trom the criterla tor 
natural sclenoe, Ortega at times otfers m.~hodologloal tool. to 
verlty his state'Dlents, but he is totally unsystematic. It one 
preters not to call an unorganized t~eatment ot sooiety a soclo-
logy, still this does not mean that a SOCiology oannot be written 
by those who systematize Ortega. On the other hand, ortega did 
not write novels or plays, but essays-.the literary genre which 
most partloipates In the style of 80cl010gioal writers. In con-
clusion, it does not make a great difterence whether one want. 
to conslder ortega a strict 800iologist or not, it one cannot 
deny the taot tha~ooiologloal oontent oan be extraoted trom 
hi. writing •• 
~ problem ~ Grand The0!7' The second dlffloulty somewhat oon-
nected with the former ls the problem of a weltansohau~ sooio-
logy or grand theorr ot ortega t • work. Ortega makes sweeping 
generalizations. He deduces hi, sociological conclusions tram 
compar1.on. ot various cultures difterent in space and time. 
From the downfall ot the Roman Empire_ for instance, he hal 
derived metasociological considerations that he applies to our 
age. Parallel are dra-.:1 between such different countries as Rome 
and England; Germany and Greeoe. The princIple. of democrao,. are 
traced to the middle as •• , and the dIvision ot nationalities are 
establiShed even betore this time. 
HOw can we give a solution to the long quarrel oentered a-
round the 80 oalled Fand theo!?, when we have such great nam •• 8. 
Par.onl and Merton, SOrokln and Kills on diftennt sid •• ot the 
battle' It i. _11 to notioe that parsons .ee. the nee_d of a 
wide soc1010gioal theorr 1n the .ame arguments that hi. adversar,., 
Merton, u.e. again.t him. 
"one of Merton'. consistent emphase. with reterenoe to theo-
rie. ot the middle range bas been on codification. Codification, 
however--neces.aril,., as he make. clear-.involves reterence to 
level. of ge.erallt,. hIgher than the level repre.ented in the par-
ti cular Items ot theory being Qodlr!ed. It doe. con at ! tute om ot 
the most important type. pt link between lower and higher levels 
Of generalization in theorye"6 
This insoluble diohotQmJ bet.een grand theor,. and theories 
Of the m1ddle range il more olearly seen in Merton'. treatment 
5Taloott Parson., -General TheoP,y in 80010187," SOCi010~ 
Tedaz, ed. by Merton, Broom and Oottrell (New York, 1959) p. 9-~ 
15 
of the 8ooiologz ~ knowledge of Mannhetm. In his IdeoloSl ~ 
Utopia, the latter attempted to end permanent17 the friction be-
tween European and American 80ciolo17 with a long defense of the 
sociology ~ totalitl (weltansohauuna), more oultivated in Europe. 
"The mass of fact. and points of vi .. w is tar greater than can be 
accomodated by the present state ot our theoretical apparatua and 
systematizing capaoity."7 'Ibis p81'agraph, written at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century is a direot ans.er to the c~rent 
writings ot Merton. Mil18 defends a t7Pe of theor,y similar to 
that of Merton on the base,S that it is oeces.&1"7 in order to lolve 
the soolal problems of our t1mea.8 Mannheim u.e. the same argu-
ment in defen.e ot the opposite position. "Like.ise it is pO.8i-
ble to explain, on the basis of this ditterence, the type ot 
thought involved In the American formulation of the problem. as 
represented by the followinga How oan % do thi., How can I solve 
this concrete ~i1dlvldual problem? And in all these questions .. 
sense th$ optimistIc undertone: I need not worry about the whole, 
the whole will take oare ot Itself."9 VIlo? Mannheim has also dealt 
with the shortoomings of a matter-~-tactne88 in sooiology. baae. 
on the atud7,ot concrete data without a general theory. He even 
goes to the extent ot sayIng that those studies which abandon 
, "" "~" >' • '~"'!...,,", 
• p 
7Mannhet., Ideology ~ utopia (New York, 1960), p. 252. 
8~. "'YrI~ht Mills,. !S!. SOciological lmaaination (Ne. York, 
1·9:-'9), p. 48: 
9iannhe1m, p. 255. 
16 
the whole and limit themselves to immediate problema 
any soientifio va1ue.10 
Merton's orltlol~ of Mannhetm is the following, "Mannhe 
analysis is limited, as well, by his failure to specify the _t~_ 
or mode of relations between locial struoture and know1edge.1I 
-
Doe. that lIlean that Merton wants a sooiol'gy of 
lated in term. of middle range? He is not too exp1ioit on th 
point, but it would seem utterly oontrar,y to the trend of a s 
1087 of knowledge the rejection of grand the0!l. 
The conolusion w. could torm from such a puzzle 
would reflect little more than personal preference.t 
how transcend the whole d1scussion and search for a solution 
another level. There 1s one point on wh10h both s1 ••• agree, 
that 11 the problem of prespective or .eltansohauungl the gen 
theme of the sooiology of lmO~dge. Merton agree. wi th Man 
d 
on the fact that so01010gy as a~olenoe is modified by the ex-
if, 
enttal situation of, a determinate ou1ture. 
of the tendenoy to introduce further concreteness into formal 
of sooiological problems, it (100101017) sets itself up .s tb 
only socioloQI~lt"ls ,unoonsciously guided by motIves similar 0 
10Ibld. p. 102: n~pirioal research which limIts it.elt 
part10u1ar sphere is tor a long time in the same position as 
mon s.n ... " 
IlMerton, Social Theory and Social structure {Glencoe, 1 
p. 498. 
a 
-
17 
those .midb prevented its historical forerunner, the burgeois 
liberal mode of thought, fro. ever getting beyond and abstract 
and generalizing mode of observation in its theory,n12 says 
Mannheim. In other words there is a point that has been left 
out of the whole discussion, namely the personal mo~ives that 
compelled Merton to favor the middle range theory and the facil-
ity with which this theory has been accepted in some cul,tural 
miliewe. It .... analyze these motiye. and their group-determUl-
anta--an area formerly thought to lie outside the domain of socio 
logy--we would probably discover that the main difference between 
the two great SOCiologists lies in their cultural background, for 
one culture is prone to the concrete and Teritiable, and th. othe 
to prospective and vision. Most probably, both are incomplete 
with regard to scientific systematizatioB. 
The cultural milieu of Ortega must enter into consideration. From 
- - -
what has been said need to approach a sociologist from the 
viewpoint of his own background and culture ia obvious. In the 
introduction we already said somethiAS about Ortega's own back-
ground. About the culture in which he lived, namely the Spanish 
culture, Moore and Gurvitch say that it is characterized by an 
uncritical tendency to theorize and set norms of behavior.13 The 
12 Ibid., p. 278. 
l3Twentieth century SOCiology (New York, 1945), p. 653. 
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last point: the normatlve character is due not only to the moral-
ist temper or the Spaniards, but mainly to the urgency ot soclal 
solutions for a ntmlber of social problems. As Moore and Gurvltoh 
point out, most of the Spanith sociologists have been exclusively 
preoccupied with the cuestion obrera.14Even to the present day, 
sPanish sociologists have spent more of their time and efrort in 
associations for working men. Spanish sociolEY has been nourished 
by socialism, on the one hand, and the social teachings of the 
Ohuroh, on the other. 
Regarding the normative aspect, we should say from the out-
set. that Ortega was not very influenced by It. It is true that 
he manlfeeted a strong tendency for action, but he conceived of 
science as divoreed l~om the quostion or value.15 
On the other hand, we do find in Ortega the second point, 
that Is, the tendency to theorize. tt ortega has brought to the 
study of society and ot its structure the keen perseption of his 
up-to-date philosophical ta.lent, evaluating the functional char-
acter of the tmass t and of the individual in his possibilities 
ot action and orientation to it. n16 
~ problem ~ methodo1o$l. There is one more question that must 
14Ibid. 
150rtege.. "Introduecion a una estimativa,1I Obras Completas, 
VI (Madrid. 1955), 315-336. ,', ','", 
l60UrvitCb and Moore, ,.657. ~, 
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be touched upon more specifically in our quest for a precise de-
finition of a socidogist. This question is method. There is no 
sociologist or any scientist, for that matter, without a methodo-
logy. Ortega deals with cultures and other social phenomena--
most espe oiallY' with the mass phenomena of today. D:>es he ground 
-
his theories in a sound method? If by method we understand stat-
istics and indices, the answer is obviously, no. But he does 
bave a lllstorico-oultural method tha.t ~A'annh.im believe s inoispen .. 
able for a sociology ot knowledge. Ortega has writtea a great 
numbe:, of pages on historioism and the historical method. ?,fann-
heim se.ya about this methodology of history: "Historicism:I.s 
neither a me~e fad nor a fashion; it is not even an intellectual 
ourrent, but the vel"Y basis on which we construct our observa-
tions of the sooio-cultural reality."l7 Few writers in the field 
of sociology to day show as profound a grasp of historical facts 
and theories as Ortega y Gasset, or indicated before when we were 
talking about his souroes. 
'Vi thin the his torioal method, Ortega makes great use of the 
oomfB rison and comparative systems of ;~reber.18 His essays about 
races and cultures are formulated and discovered with the help 
of Weber's methodologiat: tool: the ideal-typo.l9 The main dlf-
17Mannheim, Essays on the SOC1010~ ot Culture, od. by Ernest 
Mannheim and paul leosrlemetnLondon, 5'91, p. 1Ji. 
18see .. an e~l. IISobre Ie. muerte de Roma," Obras Comple-
tae, II (Madrid, 1954), 537-547. 
190rtega lion d. las masas p. ~6. 
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ferenoe between him and ~ber. however, is that the former never 
discusses explicitly his methodology. 
Ortega1s method, for the most part. is historical, as we 
said. He has been called a ~-historian and a philosopher ££ 
cultur,~. and not with eny intended oompliment. 20 He is often 
enough oritlsized for not isolating historical faots, and for his 
tnterest in similarities throughout history, rather than in facts 
Ttmasheff describes the difference between historians and socio-
logists in this way z ITThe histcrian shows the variable; the soci 
logist emphasizes the constant !l1ld recurring. n21 The keynote in 
ortega's theory of history is the ftoti(,tl of generation; an idea 
that bas oocupied also the mind of Mannhelm and other sociologist 
of hlstory.22 The basi. discoveries in the field of historic41 
socIology are used by ortega on the 'fields of political 80ciology 
and sooiology of' Jmowledge. About the hlstortcal approach, Janse 
says: "With this recognition of the importance of theory as .uch. 
there 1s growing up a corresponding apprecia+;:ton of-t~w neoessity 
of the historical approach tor a proper understanding of ourr$nt 
20 
Joaquin Iriarte, "Ortega en su vivir y pensau," HI!! '1. Fe (1956). p. 428. -
21 
'lima sheff , p. 6. 
22ESsays on the Sociology or K:nowledge(tondon, 1959). p. 
276-320. 
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theoreti •• l ~roblema and issue •• n23 And Mills, who hopes 
science that can solve many of today'. problem., observe. 
necessity orthe historical point or vie. in so.~oS7: "Men no • 
days otten reel that they cannot solve the trouble. they are 
against, so long as they remain within their p~vate situatio •• 
limited by the boundaries of their everyday worlds, most peop 
never transcend the close-up horizons ot their job and .famIly 
and neighborhood~ •• And the more award they beoome ot ideals a 
, 
threats, ambitions and promia.s. which do not tItanscend the.e 
immediate l60ale., the more trapped they come to teel."24 
The need or a theory or action and ot an orientation *hat 
taoes the present political, economic and social decisioDS ot 
our times, cannot be removed by partial sociological studies. 
With such reports, tentative and di.oonnected, one does not ha e 
adequate data tor the formulation ot .olid synthesia 
serve as an orientation tor action. The need to act is press 
and, if .e want to assure our future, we must act rationally. 
This is the point that is continually reiterated by those who 
detend a weltanschauung sociology. We could also bring in her 
23J1oward E. Jen.en, "Developments in Analysis 0::: ;':l.)cial 
Thought," in Backer and Boskott's Modern SOciological Theorz 
(B •• York, 1957), p. 41. 
~111., "The Promise of the SOoial Soi.noes," Paper give 
in 1960. 
• 
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all the arguments of Sorokin t • Fads and Foibles 1n Modern Sociol-
-- -
ogy against the modern tendenceto atomize social problems and to 
forget about the whole.25 This work contains one of the major 
statements for a historioo-sooial approach to sooiolo81. 
ortega's ~ loal. 300101061!!! practical science. Ortega'. 
-
main purpose in all hi s historical studie. was to give to the 
Spaniards of hi s time solId material upon which they could .rom 
adequate ideas of' their problems and the way to solve th$m. The 
fut~e was the great question that Ortega saw hovering over spain 
and the rest of Europe. His attempt to answer that question mer-
1 ted for him the epl taph of' social pr?phet. "If' there is anything 
that characterizes my life, it is that I have had to struggle 
with the worldt s dramatic futUl'e, the f1.1bure always tending to 
.~. tho ground of the present on whicb I had my t •• t.n26 
25!!!! and Foibles ~ Moder;p SOcl0101l. fChieago, 1956), 
sorokin, pltr~. Chicago U. Press. 
26Time (Januar;y, 1949), p. 46. 
CHAPTER II 
GENERAL SOCIOLOGY OF ORTEGA 
the ~ socl010g1ca1 !2!! ~ Ortega. ODe ot the tavorite theme. 
of Ortegats eS8ay. is the polltical px-oblem. Around It, Ortega 
builds up a socl010gical theory as a meta-polltloal toundatlon. 
The publlcation ot this theory had been promised tor many years. 
The work, entl~l.d· !!2 ~ people. was edlted wlth allght tln-
ishlng touche., atter the author's death. !! hombre Z !! 6ente 
Is, among the tew systematic works ot Ortega, the best organized. 
It centaina his main p~opo.ition8 about soclal taots, as.oclatlon, 
soclal organIzatlon, soolal ohange, and normatlve aotlon. 
The tltle ot thls chapter tlts the parallel that Ortega .s-
tabllshe. betw.en sool01081 and cultural ant~.pology. The point 
of departure tor these two flelds Is the same, becaus., as w. 
will s.e immedlately, the sooial tacta are primarily normative. 
and norms are identifled wlth oulture. 
soc1010gy !! ! !!!!-polltical foundatlon. ~ ~ people opens 
wlth a long preamble whioh 1. an almost verbatim. transcriptlon of 
hls early eS8ay: "Ensimiamamiento y alteraclon." In thls intro-
duction, Ortega stresses the imperiou. need that our age ha' to 
know .oc1010gy In order to solve the problems of an ever ehanglng 
IMan and pe2P1e, Translated from the Spanish by: Willard R. 
Trask,-an~. 6y: I.W.Norton and Co. (Ne. York, 1957). 
social order. More spe cifically. he would say, we need to have 
clear and definite ideas about the essenoe of society and of the 
social facts: 
My subject is this: Today people constantly talk otlaws 
and law, the state, the nation and internationalism, public 
opinion and Pllblic power, good policy and bad, pacifism and jingoi8Dl, "DlJ oountl'7"' and humanity, social justice and 
sooial injustice, collectivism and capitalism, socialization 
and liberali_, a nd individual and the collectivity, md so 
on and so on. .And they not only talk, in the press, at 
their clubs,c.,.., and taverns, they a180 argue. And they 
not. only argue; they also fight for the things that these 
wor~. designate. And once started fighting, they kill each 
other--by hundred., by thousands, by millions."Z 
It we asked the peale who argue about political Ideas in the 
streets and cates, what do they mean by the state, the law, the 
national, etc., we would disoover their total ignoranoe. They 
do not know anything about the phe:nomena represented by political 
terms. on the other hand, law, capitalism, colleotlvism, etc., 
are nothtng more than Idealizations ot soola1 realities. They 
are abstractions that we have learned from the society we live 
in, about this society. "It this idea is not clear," .. namely the 
idea of society--" "all these words do no mean what they pretend 
to and are mere empty show."' To derine what society is in a new 
way, 1 s the goal. or the whole work. 
2ortega, !!a~ people (New York, 1957), p. 11. 
'Ibid.,p. 12. 
-
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Wature ~ 80cial facts ~ soclet:. Ortega tells Us about his 
search for a definition of SOCiety in the works of the sociolo-
gists: Tf.tl.l the sooiologists have lett us umC" sfied, even in re-
spect to the fundamental notions of th61r soclalogles--for the 
8imple reson that they never took the trOUble to oome really to 
grip with the most elemlJnta17 phenom~na out of which the social 
reality arises.n4 
Ohoosing anthropology as a point of departure, the author 
invites us to place ourselves in front of an apets oage. The be· 
hav10. of this animal--the hearest of all to mane-surprises us 
beoause of its tatal absorption 1ntoits physical environment. 
The ap~ lives a purely extroverted lite; it react. immediately to 
the objects and alterations induoed into its field of peroeption. 
The savage liv$s also as though imprisoned in a world ot threats 
and obstaoles. Around them he direots exolusively his attention. 
But there is a great differenoe between to. savage and the apeJ 
namely that sometimes the former strives to disentangle himself 
.tram the difficulties aroWld him and he reflects and ignore. to 
his enviro:rnment. When we put ourselves in place of the ape in 
the cage, we tend to think that it would be extenuating to have 
to answer to any new stimulus, and to live so absorbed in things 
40rtega, ~ ~ Pegple (New York. 1957), p. 119. 
r· 
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outside us. Nhen the ape does not have anything to react to, 
he falls asleep. Man, on the exntrary. has an inwardness where 
he can hide, and, 80 to speak, bend himself to. This inwardness 
is an lntus, and from this work, Ortega deduees the category !a-
}erioritl. This is the first observable human behavior and has 
a vital importance for social behavior. From the depths flows 
meaning and purpose.5 All the other difference. between human 
and animal behavior are minimal compared to this. However, we do 
not intend to skip over a great nmnber of similarities between 
the two.· "bat leads man to recollect· himself is his biological 
need. B_tween the biological drives and their fulfilment, re-
flection end its derivate, sulture, set In. Thought and aotion, 
therefore, appear intimately connected in primitive mana "AC_ 
cordingly, it 1s impossible to speak of action except in 80 tar 
as it will be governed by a previous c~e.~lationJ and vice 
versa, contemplation,or being within onels selt, is nothing but 
a projecting of future aotion.n6 
w. man even add this further consideration: within this bio-
logical oontext, thought is merely functional and its role is to 
organize our behavior in order to survives "This i8 80mething ot 
5Ort• ga, ~ ~ People pp. 16-17_ 
6Ib1d ., p. 23, 
-
I""" 
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.bat I wanted to suggest in the epigram ••• that .e do not live in 
order to think but .. think in order to sucoeed in subsisting or 
surviving."7 Notioe that we are talking here about a plan, an or-
ientation for aotion. How ean Ortega, then, identlfy this plan 
with culture? The individual plan oannot become oulture until 
it beoome. sooialized. This 8ocia.lization oonsists, firat, in 
the imposition of something private through a long prooess of 
transformations. Finally this praotice beoomes aooepted as a 
use or costume of the tribe. the region., the country. Ibat Is, 
-
therefore the main differanee between the individual and social 
aotion or culture, for Ortega? 
Thoae human actions that we put on account of an impersonal 
and indeterminate subjeot whioh is the tall' and 'nobody' 
whiCh we may call, people, collectivity, .ociety, are p~er-
1'1 called social facts. Such facts are irreducible to the 
lite of the individual. They a.ppear in the realm of human 
interaotion, but are not mere facts of simple interaction. 
That which we thing or say because it is sat4, that 
which we do, because it 1s done, is uaual1y oalled usage.nS 
Social !22 individaAl aotion. Refleotion or ensimismamiento, '8.S 
Ortega oa11s it, is the human act ~ar excellenoe. Its correlatIve 
is usage, whioh is the individual aot sooialIzed. From the form-
er, we must aomehow deduce the latter. Ortega holds that the 
first oharaoteristic of t~is transmission from the individual to 
8Ortega, !! homb:re ll!! gents, p. 25. 
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the &001&1 is that or .2!.-personalization. The idea, plan or 
sk1ll·that is born in the individual today, in a oonsoiou.ta8hio 
tomorrow will be a social stereotype. wnat was responoible in it 
origin becomes impersonal and meaningless sooial behavior, some-
thing tbat we all do because everybody else does it. So that 
social and indlv1daal aetlon are mutually exclusive. This 1s, 
ot COUl'se a sobematic""''W,l,.Qcr::Looking at the sooial taots. Ortega: 
attention 1s direoted toward the oharaoteristio. at individual 
and sooial act!cl1, 50 that be is dealing with abstraotions. In 
reality, however, these two aspeots are going to btl ml.ud. But 
as suan individual and social action are irreduoible. Another 
character1stio of sooial action is its lack of meaning. Ortega 
sqa. "That is human, which I do, because it has a meal ing for 
me and which I understand.,,9 When 'individual aotion becomes .001a 
lzed, it loses the or-iginnl meaning that cI'eated it, and keeps 
only its purpose. The purpose of sooial action is normative ~nd 
performs a great servioe, eo tar as social integration is concern-
ed. In order to ver-i.fy this whole the si IS about the irreducibility 
or BOcial into individual aotion, Ortega gives a detalled descrip-
tion of the origln ot social acts. 
~ third level ~ human action: the inteEPersonal. There is one 
element that medlates individual ana soclal behavior: interper-
r 
sonal act10n. Human existenoe has as m,ch need or objects as 
of SOCiety. From a biologioal viewpOint, the environment 1s 
so connected. with. human behavior tr.w.t the external stimulus, 
or c1rcumstances, as Ortega calls it, is an integral part of 
human organisma "The environment is not-something external to 
tbe organism, but rather an orga11 of life, the organ of excita-
tion. n·10 
lb1·!U&\W~'·~e:· ~bam!ID'la~ 21 lattneVoll&l aotion. 
,.a ... '.lelo,l_l .-ial. flU. Act ... 1._. at the Ixt.mal 
_'-I .. i •• , ·W ... • ., W _.l~ al __ ,..,~ •• i,. Of oon'.mpla. 
tion. From tbe tree that blocks our path to the tood we eat, 
things are the obstacles or helps with wnich we have to deal in 
order to·survive. In their first relation to us, external things 
are presented as faoilities or disadvantages that expand or con-
tract the possibilities ot our lite. This ia the primordial as-
peot of things outside U8, 
The world ot oiroumstance, we said, 1s thus an immense prag-
matic or pract1cal rea11ty--not a rea11ty made up ot things. 
-Things- in present-day parlanoe means anything that has 1 ts 
be1ng by and in itselt, hence that 1s independent ot u •• 
But the component. of the vital world are only those that 
are for and in m1 life--not for themselv •• and 1n thea.elv.8. 
They are only as tac11itie. and diffioulties, advantages and 
disadvantages whereby the I that each one ot us 1. can suo-
ceed 1n being. They are, then, 1n etfect! Incruments, u-
tensils, cbattels, mean. that serve me ••• 1 
lOortega, "Ep1togo al libro tDe France.ca. BeatrIce," Obraa 
CompleBia, III (Madr1d, 1955), 325. 
llortega, ~~ ,.op~e, p. S2. 
Things are ordered according to a pragma tical hirarchr, 
one to another, their final organization ending in the satis-
faction of 80me needs of mine. I eee them in terms of a person-
al goal,12 In order for this hierarohy to be useful, ~hin~s have 
to be determinable and predictable.- Things have a definite PI'&!-
matieal value once I know them, because loan predict beforehand 
the reaction of my organism with regard to them: "An adult human 
being' 8 every action toward or upon w mething olJviously take. 
into account his earlier experienoes in oonnection with that 
something, so that his action starts from the qus.lltiesthat. ao-
cording to his knowledge, the things possesses. In our example, 
he knows that that stone is very l~rd but not as hard as steel; 
and if what he wants to do, fQ)r some purpose of his own, is to 
break it to pieeee, he knows tba t he can do so by merely hl tting 
it wi th til. hammer." 13 But the other presents himself to.tre in 
a diametrically opposed fashion. Let UB see the way Ortega de-
picts this appearance of the other man: 
Now indeed, in the area that my horizon encloses, appears 
the Other. The 'Other' is the other man. As a sensible 
presence, all that I have of him is a body, a body that 
d1spla1. its peculiar form, that move., that manipulates 
things in my sight, that in other words exhibits external or 
vis1ble 'behavio~. to use the term of the Amemican psychol-
ogists. But the suprising th1ng, the strange and finally 
m1sterious thing, i8 that, though there are present to U8 
120rtega~ . "El tema de :nuestro iiiempo," Obras Cosp1eta.., 
IIr (~adrid, 1955), 182 ••• 
;130~tGga; !!!! ~ people, p. 85. 
onl, a t1gure and lOme bod117 movements, 1n or through 
this presenoe we see sornoth1ng that 1s essentially in-
v1s1ble, a;)methlng tba t 18 pure inwardne8s, lIOaetfins 
that eaoh of us knows direotly only of himself ••• 
We are 1n the field of social psyohology. to which ~ 
fact2, Ortega reduces all his soc1010g1cal investigations of 
this 6ssay. What we discover first, or rather, glimpse in the 
other man is an inwardness like our own. So far the universe 
has 'been unified. Now it 'becOUlt98 dispersed. Before, everything 
had its own plaoe ill ml universe in relation to me. Now my "here" 
and "there" begins to be relative. There are other people and 
therefore there are other puints of reference. "I can change 
my place, but wha~ever place it may be, it w1l1 be my ther~' 
Apparently 'here' and tIt and there l are inseparable for 11fe. 
And s1nce the world, with all the things in it, must b,tor!.! 
from here. it automatically beoomes a prespectlve--that Is, its 
thing. are near to or far from h!!:.!, to right or left of the,r!,. 
above or below here. This 1s the structural ~w of man's world, 
When other people tip pear into the soene of life: ·''.£he Other MaD 
also has his here--but thls'here f of the Other 1s not mine. 1t16 
Another gre&. t dirfa rence between the thing and the ,Qther 
Man consists 1n the fact of z'eciproo1ty. "Hence, in our rela-
tion with the stone, our action has only one direotion, it runs 
14Ib1d., p. 91-92. 
lSIb1d., p. 74 
-16Ibid." p. 75. 
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from us to the atone, and there s1mply ends. 1t17 trIn distinc· 
tlon from the s ton~ and the plant, the animal, fI __ or, 1n o'llr case 
man--appears to .e: &8 S)meth1ng tba t responds to me and 1n this ~~ It 
sense assomethlng that does not simply ex1 st tor me but that, 
. ! 
/ 
since I also exis.~ for it, co-exists wi-th me. The stone exists 
but does not co_e~lst."18 Man becomes interpreter as well as 
interpreted. I b~pome, tor the first time, an object of some-
- \ body else. ThincJS\were blind and could not see my inwardness. 
" \ Now eye. are 100ki~ at me and sanebody answers me in an unpl"e-
dictabl~ manner. WIth regard to our relation with animals and-
people, ortega 8ay.: "However our total relation with the ani-. 
mal is at the time lim! ted and eontused. 'fhi s suggests to us 
a very natural methodolog1oal reservation--tbat we should look 
for other taota in wblch the reeiprooity would be clearer, un-
limited and evIdent, tha t 1s, in which the other being that re-
spond. to me should in prinolple be-capable of responding to me 
as muoh as I respond to it._19 Evidently this 1s the case of 
a man-to-man relation. Reciproe1ty, as Ortega calls that re-
lation, is an Immediate nudIty of man betore man that consti-
tutes the interper.onal phenomenon. The interpersonal wo~ld 
l7rb1d -=,p. 85. 
18rb1d ., p. 87. 
19rb1d., p. 103. 
is the world of affective and indormal meetings; the world of 
friendshlp and kindahip. 
Differenc~ between ~ i?terpersoal ~~ social level. Usages 
When the Other Man has not entered this realm of interper-
sonal relations, I do notas yet have either a social Oran 
lnterindividual bond with him. The OtberMan Can turn out an 
enemy or a friend. Therefore, when we meet, we have to break 
the barrier between both of us, at the same time. Therefore, 
we~Jstart out with the odd gesture of holding and shaking each. 
other's hand. This sooially patterned gesture, meaningless to 
both 'of us lathe social action par excellence. We do not know 
anything about the origin and primitive meaning of the handshake. 
We do it just to oQnform. On the other hand this gesture has 
the roarvelous effect of symbolically placing both of us under a 
common shelter, the law, the mores, the uaages. In shaking 
bands we .eem to tell each other tr~t it is our wish to submit 
bo some general code of la.ws stipulated by a society. But we 
implicitly symbolize those things without explicitly revealing 
ourselves, because the handshake is an impersonal act. It is t h 
means to manipulate a "stranger". "Between us," says ortega, 
"only a relative and indirect a~d always dubious co~aunication 
!,s" .PO~S.,;~~l~~.,. ,)3:H,~",, __ firgt and last, that is, a t the beginning 
~' .~ 
and at the end of my experience in respec~~':,the ·other Man, 
for me he is fundamentally the Being wh/l~~ ett'tftlgN ''\;0 me, the 
\ l..JNiVFrt'::..:'il: , 
~ Lli v: . :;'" 
r· 
/ 
" 
I 
Ij 
" 
the essentia):' Cst rang_:r.·20 The note of torelgnnesl, permeates 
/ t . 
all social/ reall~t7: ntn a man's body whicb, as suoh, belongs 
, I, 
to my WOrld, ~. ba". tbe intima t10n and the deolara tion of a 
f' I 
being--the other-.,.and! a World--his world--which are absolutely 
alien, absolute11 foreign to me, strange to me and to everything 
that i8 Ddne .n21,: Ortega oalls this world ot social relations 
! ,I 
the .orld ot t~e hot-I, 80 that in 1t I am leading a pseudo-11fe • 
. I 
Our normal,' life consists ln our ocoupy1ng ourselves with 
pregma ta,' wf!th things or concerns and importances tha. t 
are not properly sucb but are new irrespons1ble interpret-
ations put !f.orth by others or by ourselves; If_tba t is to 
. 8a,., the U~g.8. ttl mean tta t since our life consists in 
always do1,ng, something with or about these pseudo-things, 
it 'would .inetltabl,. be a pseudo ... dolng (bacer), precisely 
the pseud.o-doing that appeared to us earlier as t he very 
common but very profound e~presslon 'hac.. que •• hace' 
(pretenA), that 1s, we hal"'.tually pretend to live, but we 
do notaotuall,. live our genuine life, the lite that we 
should have to live it, freeing ourselves fram all these 
·in terpreta tions accepted by the other people ..... who are 
commonly called 'society.' we from time to time made pner-
getlc and clear oontact with our lite as radioa reallty.22 
From all this ~V1OU8 discussion, ortega conoludes, again~ 
Max Weber and Illrkhe1m, tha t soclal reality must be distinauished 
not only from individual but also from Inter-individua.l action. 
"The soolal appears not, as has hitherto been believed a.nd was 
far too obvious, when we oppose it to the individual, but when we 
20~., n.JAO .. 
21 !lli. ,"'U~ .... l2Q ... 
'. .. 
/ 
contrast 1 t w1 tb t ~e Inter-Indi vidua 1. ,,23 
Aocordlngiy,there are three levels of human behaviorl 
the In~ividual. the Inter-individual and the sooial. These 
/' 
leve,ls are irreduoible when they are oonsidered abstraotly, 
,j j 
1.~J, 
but in real 11fe, they 1ntermingle with one another. 
,/" 
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·/Coercion of the'social facts. A further characteristIc of the 
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usage, or soclal faot, whioh is partloula rly relevant to poll ti-
cal sociology and oul tural anthropolog7, Is t he moral at rain. 
Ou~ determinatioa to llve in a soolety implIes a whole var~y of 
usages. to whioh we must neoesaarily adjust. But who exerc+ses 
, 
! 
1/ thi, moral'compulsion of the usages~ The oollectivity, the 
people, everybody.24 Ortega mentIons an example where this 
i:mor"l compulsion can be better recognIzed.. Suppose we try to 
or~s8 the street and a p.olioeman halts us. CertAinly, ortega 
wo~ld say, it is not the polioeman as an individual who forbids 
us Itowalk. The polloeman 1s a mere public Inft rument of an 
organization: the government, fDolet1, the. people. Now the 
\ 
pe<l\i"'1s~'eve:t1tbOdy and nobod1 in a oertaln way. 
And we ask ourselves: who Is the subjeot of this human 
actj nY' ~,h~t we call 'to forbid t to oommand lestl1y? VJho 
23 Ibid_, p. 179. 
-
24 "Well then, who 8 ays what 1is said"? Obviously, each 
one of us; but we way what we say i~ the sam& way that the pollce-
nan stops us, we eiay it not on our account 9~;6W. account of th1s 
unse1zable, indeterminate, Sl'ld impos sible Laut~;1A~1 people, societl 
the collecti v1 ty." p. 173. 
forbid. ua' Who commands us? It is not the man po1ioeman 
nor the man S5)erintendent, nor the man Chief ot ~~ate 
who is the au ecf or this action of foro!dd!ng:and command-
~--we-say--come from the state • 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• But then who or what is this state that commands me 
and stopa me trom crossing from one sidewalk to the other' 
If we put this question to someone, we shall see him 
begin by spreading out his arms in. a swimming gesture--which 
is what we commonly do when we are going to say something 
vague--and he will say: "Why, the state is everything, sooi-
ety, and co11ectivity."25 
Physical force and us.~es: The Government. Somebody could objeot 
!hiE tSe governm-eDt has notHIng to do w!fih social tacts. However 
political .ws are 1ega1ized usages that have a stronger degrtt 
of coertion. It is agreed among tho political scientists that 
one ot the essential notes at governmental activity is preoisely 
the use ot physical coertion. Moral coertion consists in the 
pressure that SOCiety exercises upon the individual for the altn-
tananoe of its usages. The coertion that usages carry in them-
selves can be very slight, but to break any kind of usage always 
involves some sanction. One case of alight c~ertion would be 
the lover that does not want to use the comm0q6xpressions ot his 
society to communicate his subjective feelings.26 In such a case, 
the lover is condemned to solitude. 
When, on the contrary, usages are strong they are reinforced 
by physical law. Strong usages are called vigenci!.!, and theY' 
25 Ibid., pp. 171-172. 
-
26Ortega, Man and People, (New York, 1957), pp. 223-224. 
--
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become public opinion, and the latter, in its own t~n. becomes 
power.27 aence we have related in one and the same system of ex-
planation sociology and politics as two classes ot soc1F1 tacts 
difterent only tn degree. 
Fact. ~ e!planation. The toregoing explanation is more logical 
than real. In real llfe, the process ot human behavior beglns 
with usages and ends up in recollection (ensimiamamlento). Man 
. 
does not begin his human li~e with the strong eftort to became 
recollected and to retreat from hi. milieu. Previous to the en-
-
s1mismam.iento there must exist a societ,.. By breaking off trom 
this 80cietJ, to which he has adjusted, the individual becomes 
an exception and hls self develop.. The "I" is the last thing to 
appear, and the ",.." is the first. This psychologioal observa-
tion i. described as tollows by Brtega: 
Apparently our "I" is the last character to appear in the 
tragicomedy of our lite. We have otten reterred to him, 
but irresponsible, taking him for granted, so tthat we might 
begin to understand one another. Nevertheless, I have .er-
eral tim •• pointed out that all the names I found myself 
obliged to use tor the • subject' of living were inadequateJ 
that it was incorrect to say that Man lives. We bave already 
seen that original Man is the Other and that rather than live 
he co-lives with us and we with him. But co-living is al-
ready a second and pre.umed reallty whertas living in radical 
.611tude is primar,y and unquestionable.2~ 
Without a 8001al milieu, the "I" cannot emerge. Robinson 
Crusoe migrated to an island after he had lived in a normal soc-
iety and formed an adequate concept of him.elf through other men. 
Had he been lett in the Island at an early age, he would not had 
27 Ibid., pp. 268 and 
28 'O!'t1r a Man and Pe 
reached the stage of a human person, according to ortega_ 
Transition !£2! individual !2 social action: ex.!plaritl_ We 
-
stressed the fact that the usage. are born in the individual and 
are progressively incorporated into society when they become dee. 
personalized and lose their meaning. However, it is clear that 
not all individual aots come to be usages. Vlhioh is thea, the 
essential note of the usage with regards to its institutional-
ization? It would not suffice to expLlin the insti tutiona1izatio 
of usages by means of imitation. The theory of Ward about 
imitation has been proved wrong, because imitation is selective 
and ,;ve connot eXplain and predict. until ''fe di scover the laws and 
funotion of the . selective prooess of 1m.itation.29 
At this point, Ortega introduces his theory of exemelaritl. 
In his studies of language-formation, Ortega describes the phen-
omenon of. exemplarity in this way: "Por a usage to be constituted 
not all the individuals in a society need be ln agreement ••• It is 
enough ll--consciously or not--those who oonstltute a certain num 
ber are in agreement. What number? The majority? This is the 
majoritarian error. Sometimes it is the majority; but at other 
times--and nearly always.-is preoise1y a minority ••• whioh, by a-
doptIng a particular behaVior, sucoeeds, with a strange automa-
tism impossible to describe briefly, in making that behavior ••• 
29see Krech and Crutohfield, The0ti and Problems of Sooial 
Psyohology, (New York, 1948), Chapter 1:-- --
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become that terrible and inexorable social force, a usage. n 30 
tt::z; 
A faw lines la tar, he calls this phenomenon Itbinding observance, 
l~en several people meet the next singular phenomenon takes place 
Somebody stands out from the group and takes the iniciative. He 
says or does somethin:z interesting"which is adopted by the rest 
of the group. People imitate this individual action because it 
satisfies some unconscious need, and also because the originator 
of the a ction has a certain authority.32 The leader will succeed 
if he is able to choose the course of action that fits the pre-
sent social circumstances of the group. The conditions for the 
accept~Jce of the individual action by the group aI'e therefore, 
satisfaction authority consists in an interpretation of What the 
group needs together with a power of exemplarity or suggestion. 
From the side of the group-members, there has to bea qocility 
or submission, so that exemplarity and docility are the two side 
§~ the social process. 33 The process of socializationsta~ts out 
in the core of the family. The child sees in his parents his 0 
models of behavior. They are for him the prototype of humanity, 
so to speak. 34 On the other hand, the parents have to interpret. 
30ortega, Man and People, p. 210. 
31 Ibid. 
320rtega, ttEspana invertebra.da," Obras_ Completall, III (Ma 
1955), 55 ••• 
33Ibid ., pp. 103-109. 
34T5iO., p. 104. 
the child's need.. Cluldhood ends when the parents cease to be 
the only authority and become members of a larger sooiety. At 
this moment docility is reduoed as also Is selective imitation. 
other values will have to be introduced into the scene to give a 
foundation to the authrlty of the parents. Also, this authority 
begins to deslntegrat.. The school, the peer-group, the co~~unity, 
bttcome new social models for imitation. They are looked upon 8S 
an e~le. 
The social leader. The true leader is the one who has the right 
in sight into the real ci:;"'cumstance s and knows how to coorlinate 
the efforts of many in order to bring about the end, t!hen th1s 
.henonmenon is extended to SOCiety the social ciroumstanoes of 
the eroup become the soclohistorioal scene, Na.poleon, Alexander, 
Caesar, were not only men Who electrified the orowds (exemplarl!l), 
ut they also were men who had a deep insight into a socio-histor-
lcal. situ61tion. They possessed a clear vision of the i"..lture in 
erma of the present; the present being the anxieties and needs 
h.t were unoonsoiously ~.lt by their oontemporaries. 
Thus, during the days of Caesar, Rome was orumbling beoause 
t the lask of politioal imagination. The nat10n followed an old 
attern of po11tioal organization and expansion that did not square 
T.hJ.s plan oonsisted in . looking at the bi. citie" as 
he political focuses and at the ('.ountry as a mere rumsz. The 
ountrymen were forced to go to the o1tes in order to vote. The 
empire, on the other hand, was getting larger and larger. The 
provinces became so numerous that it was impossible to control 
them. The army had to be increased and as a consequence, the 
political consciousness of the countrymen increased. What was 
Caesar's oolutiont According to Ortega, Caesa~. main polItical 
quality was a great mental clarity, to define the problem. We 
said at the beginning of this chapter that politios is consti-
tuted by a number ot abstraotions: law, the national, the inter-
natinnal, etc. Tbe main diffioulty in the art of politics is to 
find,. til. simple, scherneof ideas with a social appeal and at the sam 
time, capable of solving the great social puzzles. "Hen,-that is, 
Caesar "wants a Roman empire which does liO\; live on Rome, but on 
~he veriphery, on the provinces, and this implies the complete 
supl"ession of the Oity .... State.'· 35 The historical leader haa his 
hand immersed in the confused stream of socie-historioal tacts. 
!his work of leadership that Oaesar exeroised alone, is performed 
,in society by a minority that stands out from the crowd. The 
tun'cition of such a minority is historical and consist. mainly in 
foreseeing the future. Through a process of naturll seleotion, 
societies become organized in the form of a minority-majority re-
lation, and this minority is usually an aristooraol in the primi-
350rtega, ~ Revolt £! ~ Masses, p. 175. 
tive sense of this word (government of the best one s), "This re-
ciprocal action between mass and minority ••• is, to my judgment, 
the basic fact of any society and the main agent of Its evolution 
for the better or the worse. n36 
Authoritl ~ foroe a!-normal functions ~ society. There haa 
to be something in common between a majority and a minority so 
that sooiety comes to be and keeps together. Ortega does not 
distinguiah between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft as Simmel does, 
because for Ortega, there is no such a thing as a mere spontaneou 
organization of society.37 The moral or physical coercion that 
usages bear, olearly indicate that the prooess of socialIzation 
is not a natural one. Accord1ng to Ortega, man is just as social 
as antisooial, and SOCiety is constituted by a dominance of the 
soolal foroes over the ant1-~ocial tendenoies.of men. In this 
theory sooiety 1s not previous to a ssooiation. 'rhe former con-
sists in a will ~o live in cammon. The people and the cultur •• 
says Ortega, are born when they have!"he determined will to do 
80. The striving for a common goal planned b7 a minor1ty, .on-
stitutea society itself. Such a common goal must be appealing 
and practical if society wants to perpetuate itself. It has to 
change according to the signifioant cultural changes throughout 
history. Sooiety is a dynamic reality that increases and d1m1ni-
Sheth Strictly speaking there is no such a thing as an immobile 
1955)36~t!6~' "Espana invertegrada," Obras Campletas,III (Madrid 
r· 
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societZe sooiety is always a mobile one.""Its reality is purely 
-dynamic) something to be done, the community in action."?B Talk-
ing about Rome, Ortega also says: "Rome was a great vital enter-
prise Where everybody could collaborate.n39 
Let us reflect on two implioations ·of this t ~~17 of society. 
The first one, is that it t.nde to identify society with politionl~ 
society, that is, society politically organized uride~ a govern-
ment. The second is that, by making society depend on the plan of 
a minority--a minortty that Ortega oalls frequently the intelleot-
uala--suoh a theory beoomes a kind of ideological determinism. 
-We will see later on which are the implications ot these two pointlS 
with regards to political eociologz and sociol0§Y ~ knowledge. 
Unity 2£ 2. Eoints 2!. departure ~ sociologz ~ anthropoloV. 
V\1hen we referred to the usage as the Bocial aot p tar excell-
ence, we established a parallel betweQn sociology and cultural an-
thropology. Let us see now more olosely this relation. 
For Ortega cultUre is nothing more than as aspeot of the aoo-
ial fact. If we make the lattep the material object, oulture, we 
would say, looks at this material object aa a produot at human 
reason, rather than as a means of communicat10n and sooial inter-
38Ortega, The Revolt of the Masses, p. 184. 
- -----
39Ortega, "Espana invertebrada," Obras Completas, III (Madrl< 
1955), p. 56. 
oourse. The first thing that man does when he reflects 1s to or-
der the phenomena around him sO that he might carry out his plan 
ot action. To perform this plan, he has to catalogue the.e phen-
omena. The cultural act par excellenoe is, therefore, the con-
cept. The ensimismamiento creates ideologioally what will be-
come later teohnique, usages and sooia1 aotion in general. With-
out oulture, the oosmos becomes chaos. "Besides the oontinuous 
need of a hierarohy. without which the ooanos becomes ohaos, I 
cons14er very urgent, that we direct our attention and refleo-
tion to what surrounds us. Man is at the utmost of his capaoit-
ies When he aquires full consciousness of his circumstances.n40 
After the act of reflection man comes back to the world with a 
plan, but most important of all, he comes baok with a feeling of 
seourity_ Now, man has grasped the dangers and facilitIes and 
possibilites of aotion. Culture, whether it be material (teohni 
que)tr formal (norm., thinking-patterns, language) is the W8:'1 
man oontrols his environment. "Culture," says Ortega, "is not 
the whole life, but the moment of seourity, firmnes8 and olarity_ 
We invent the concept as an instrument, not to substitute for tb 
spontaneity of life, but to seoure i t. n4l And in another place 
he explains what is the meaning of this olarity: "Clarity means 
40ortega, ".editaoiones del Quijote," Obras Completas, I 
p. 319-
4lIb1d., p. ;56. 
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quiet possession, dominanoe of our consciousnes8 upon images and 
anxieties caused by the objects that threaten us. tt42 coneepts ape 
the necessary condition for the creation of any material cont~ol 
of the environment. But man needs also an intellectual oontrol 
of his circumstance for its own sake. Man has to have a reason 
to live. He asks for an explanation of everything. Material cul-
ture is only the condition for refleotion, aocording to ortega. 
Instead of living immersed taking oare of our needs, we invert 
something so that the needs can take care of themselves, so to 
speak, and thus we oan reflect. "Technique is not the adaptation 
of the subject to his environment, it is rather the oontrar,r, the 
adatation of the environment to the subject.,•43 For man, being 
1s never a goal. Man $eeks for a well-being, and it is thi. well-
being that justifies his life. The product of ensimismamiento is 
an individual action is potentially socIal. bedause it is directed 
to other men. The reason for this is that our life is threatened 
by everything around Us. Our tendency to survive impells us to 
make allies out of people around us, in order to preserve our 
lives together. "I am Me and my oiroumstance," is the famous say-
42Ibid., ;57. 
43Ortega, "En8imismamiento y alteraoion," Obras Completas, V 
(Madrid. 1955), '26. 
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in oulture, says Ortega, are caused by dlfferences in the spirit 
of creativity or barbarism of each country, The period of in-
vasion of the German10 raoes is the period of great culture-torma 
tion that builds the different Europoan nationalities.47 This 
culture.formative period produces its results in the beginning 
of the middle ages. liThe middle ages l'Vere personalist," says 
ortega.48 Honor ~~d right, law and war, are studied by ortega in 
their areat! va prooess. For purpose of brevity we must ommit 
these socia-historical studies that const! tute, so to speak, the 
main bulkwark of verification of all these ideas.49 
The conclusion soams to be that culture and barbarism are 
identically important for the maintenanae of the historical tlux. 
Ortega seems to identify creativity with lawlessness. CreatIvity 
implies, it 1s true, some escape fram old molds, but not necessar 
11y from law, if law is understood in a dJ~amio form. 
47ot-tega, "Espana. Invertebrada," Obras 0?MPletas, III (Madrl 
1954), pp. 110-112. 
48 
ortega, I1Notas del vago estio," Obras Oompl.taa, II (Madrl 
1954> t p. 420 passim. 
4901'. ftMedltaciones del Quljote," Obraa Completas," Obras' 
C?!K1etas, I (Madrid, 1953), pp. 309-401. and "Xi'tUhllos" tsla. 
PP. 170:263. ----
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CHAPTER III 
THE P0LITICAL SOGl: OLOGY O? ORTEGA 
~ tield ~ Political ,Soolo1o§l: Political sociology eonstitutes 
an inter-disoiplinary field. The politioa.l ~eienoes are a number 
of diseiplines that prepare the seientist and the politioian tor 
political evaluation and political aotion. "whether political 
science l8 considered as an art or a soienc~ or both, we may alill 
ways say that it helps people to better undEirstand problems of 
our time and to solve them. . 
polItical science 1s considered by man,. sociologists as a 
branch of general SOCiological theory. Thus We'er desoribes it 
as that part ot sociology having to do with Dower and physieal 
foroe: "Ultimately one can detine the modern state sociologically 
only in terms ot the specific means peouliar to it, as to every 
polItIcal assocIation, namely, the use of physioal torce."l Weber 
does not only apply to polltioal phenomena the same methodologieal 
tools be uses in soolo1ogy, but he treats a great deal ot polItical 
matter8 group.d under l .... r 800iologloal problem •• 2 Hi. main 
-
lMa.x Weber, "Polities as a voeation," From .Max Weber: EssaI8 
1n SOeiology, translated and edited by Gertn-ina-l!l1. (New for I 
1958), pp. 77-78. 
ZWeber, The0j1. of So01a1 and Eoonomio Orr,an1zation, translat-
ed by Henderson ( ew-York, 19471; pp. ;41 ••• 
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studies were direoted to the problem of political authority and 
politics as a vocatton and an intitution of sooiety. 
Parsons following the same trend, considers the power alemen 
as a concrete case of his general theory of aotion. "Neither pow. 
in the polittcal sense," he says, "nor the operation of governmen 
as a subsystem of thesoolal system can be treated in terms of a 
specifioally specialized conceptual scheme of the awne order as 
tha.t of economic theory.lf; And Mills focuses it as a special 
case of the problem of values in sociology.4 Politics as an art, 
or as a theorJ of action. involves the knowledge of the social 
sciences among which sooiology plays the most lmpoirtant role. Be 
aide. the general stUdies of groupe and 1nstitu~ions, t'amily alld 
oommunities and minorities. there are a number of social problems 
that by tb1er nature, are more related to politics. Such are the 
atud1A s of social movements, social oontrol, authority, bureau-
,.,., ,"-~ 
cracy, electoral trends and many othera.5 "The term, Political 
Soc1010gy," 8ay8 Bernard. It is relEt ively new in this country, but 
it has long been in use in Europe, where a number of text books 
bear that name."6 Among those European countries listed on the 
3Talcott Parsons, The SocIal System,{Glencoe, 111inois,1952), 
p.126. --------
4gee seymour Martin Lip ~t, n Poll tical Sociology, 1\ Socl010p: 
Today (New- York, 1959), PJil.X~! .. 112. 
50. ',~rrlght Mill s, The Soc1 (')lC'glc~l Imaglna tion, (New York, 
1959), p. 178. --- --- , 
6L. Bernard, n~ Field 2! Poltical SociolgZ," l.. ~. !!:.!!' 
III (1 8), 1 • 
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,ame page, he mentions Spain. The groundwork o£ Poltiotll sool-
010g1, continues Bernard, ia sociolog1cal, but its aIm is politi-
oal. The subject that has been studied perhaps with most interest 
bY polltioal sooiologists is sooial movements.7 "SOciety means 
a system of ortered relations ••• socIal regulation i,s always pre. 
sent, for no sooiety can exist without some oontrol over the natlv 
impulses of human beings," McIver says, The same author seem. to 
consider Poltioal Sooiolgy as the study ot a partioular type of re 
gulation or control of society.8 
The dirferenoe between SOoiology and Political Soience 1s 
based on the traditional distInction between man and oitizen, 
socIety and atate. 9 But suoh a distinction, as Lipset points out, 
is based on the old political theories o£ the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries whioh pr~ved wrong throughout history.10 The stat 
; 
1s nothing added to sooiety, and ita presence only meaha that such a 
a society is politioally organized, which means just that it ia a 
7 Rudolf' Heberle, sooial Movement s (Wew York.. 1951), and 
!obert M. McIver, The Web or OOvernment (New York, 1958). 
--------
~oIver. The Web of 80vernment .j. 22. 
-----. ........ ~--.... 
9Llpset, "political Sociology," Socl010Eg Todal (Ne .. York, 
1959), p. 82. 
lOIbld. 
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sooiety_ For, excepting the primitive historical period •• we 
can say that without politioal organitation there is no society. 
This does not mean that the same reality oannot be looked upon 
from a different angle by the sociologist and by the political 
scientist. 
~ n-.ltanschauung" aEproach t~ politioal pheno~ena: PolItical 
soienoe as an art is not a modern phenomena. But the knowledge 
that it requires has varied impressively thoughout history. Un-
til ty~ oenturies ago, the only soientifio knowleAge relevant to 
the art of government was histo17 and warfare. 'l'oday something 
more is required to taoe the present oomplex polltioal problema. 
PoJtioal SooiologJ oan oontribute as no other sclence to adequate 
politioal decisions and judgments. But such political deoi81ons 
today require eomething more than the data of these sooial 80ie 
oes. Mar,nheim has stressed the importance ota 80cl.10gy of know-
ledge that provides a prespective or ~eltanschauuns·in order to 
meet present political d~mands.ll 
orteaa !! ! Politioa~ Sociolo§ist: In what sense can Ortega y 
Gasset be called a po".t!cal Sooiologist? Ortega's studies in 
this area constitute one of his main oontributions to sooiology 
to the present day.12 Tha text--books that mention him consid-
er him almost exolusively a political sooiologist. Ortesa has 
llKarl, Mannhelm, Ideoloil and Utopia (New York, 1959), pp. 
lO9-18~. ---
i
1d2 w •• eanh thatt 8ame other sooiological ~tudieStmfY be ~ore ons erea 1n t e ru ure. The resent _orK alms at h. goa~. 
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studied a number of political questions that go from the e],ec-
toral techniques to his great thesis of Revolt of ~ Maese8. 
The point of view that prevails in all those work. in his general 
thesis about political facts that he describes in this fashionl 
"Nei ther this volume nor I are pol!.tiolI1l18. The ract 1. that 
what we talk about here, is something that is previous to poli-
tics and belongs to its background. ttl3 This background ot the 
political rects for Ortega, Is clearly the sooiological consti-
tution of society. For all the political .. arks of Ortega are 
unintelligible without his theory of usages, association and .~ 
emplarity. As a matter of tact the political works of Ortega are 
a mere application of all his sociologioal studies to the polIte 
loal facts of today. "The state,tl says Rubio, !tis theretore the 
most external form of the collectivity, something like the super-
lative form of the 80cia1."14 Let us remenber What we said at 
the beginning of the second ohapter about politioal faots. Pol-
itical facts are abstraotions that stand for soolal realIties, 
rumd the only way to study them scientifioal1y is to penetrate the 
nature of their basis: the sooia1 faots. This oorresponds to the 
13 . 
ortega, La rebelioD de las masas, p. 25. 
--
l.4aub1o-Hernandez, sociologia y politica e!: Ortega 1 GaSSEtt 
(Barcelona, 1958), p. 32. 
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modern studies about myth and the State.15 The state is based on 
general usages that Ortega calls beliees, and that constitute its 
justification. f! By JlIItths," McIver says, "we understand the value 
impregnated beliefs and notions that men hold, tha.t they live by 
or live for. Every society is held together by a. mpth, a complex 
of dominating thoug~t-forms th~ determines and sustains all its 
activities.n16 And among these activites, one is politics. All 
this will appear more clear in the next few pages and especially 
in the chapter about the soctology of knowledge, that should be 
related to the matter pzesented under consideration. 
Leading themes o!-Orteia's Political Soclolo~: The bulk of the 
ptlitical work of Ortega is constituted mainly in these three es. 
says; listed. in order of importance: 1h! Revolt .2! ~ Masses, 
Invertebrated ~a~ and ~ ~ !!! StIles in Politics. (If we in 
vert this order we have them lined up chronologically). The pol. 
Itioal ideas of Ortega y Gasset, however, are spread throughout a 
his essays. The Revolt ot the Masses 1s the best known of his po 
.. ....... __ I 
1tioal works. This book is nothing more than a look at present 
European dond1t1ons i'rOl1l a sociologioal point of view. It begins 
by saying; "One of the most unforturnate things of our times is 
that when the people from the lJast face the terrible conflicts of 
toda~ publl0 life. they have fouqd themselves stuffed with a 
15Ernat Oas8irer, The Myth and the state, (New Baven, 1946). 
16MoIver, The \Yeb of Government, p. 4. 
---
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primitive equi~eDt or erroneous notions about what society. the 
collect1vity. individuals. usages, the law and justiceare."17 
M!E. and People !!!.9. !l!. pol:1t1oal implications; ~ ~ People is 
the tool ~or the interpretation of this work ju~t as for all othe 
pol1tioal essays. In spite of the tact that Ortega intadded to 
write Man ~ People as an introduotion of a work that never own. 
out, from the last few pa.ges of the essay and from the referenoe. 
to it of many other works, we oen reconstruot the main COUl'se of 
transit10n from the sociological aspeot of usages to their polit-
I ( ioal aspect. 
!h! Sociologioal Approach 12 Political Facts: Two of' the fea-
tures of usages were : first, their impersonal charaoter and se-
cond, their co.roian. I want to oross the street but I find my-
self inhibited by a oustom or law. This inhibition is primordi. 
ally due to a moral pressure of a sooial charaoter that oan be-
come at times physical also. In the oase of the lover that we 
mentioned before, we disoovered aqlnfirnal degree of illoral coer-
cion in so far as he could not express his feelings. "But sooner 
or later--and this is important to be not1ced--there exists the 
eventuality of physioal foroe."18 
The second charaoteristic of usages, namely their imperson-
ality, has to do with the subjeot of their coercion. lji,'ho exer-
cises this authority? Who forbids us o_oasing the street? 
17La rebelion de Ian masas 'PP. 13-14. 
18 --
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And this power, w.h1oh generally manifeats itsel! wi th euphe-
m1sms of moral coeroion and P NSSUI'e, of oausing us moral 
damage, but Whicb in the end alwa78 threatens with the event-
uality of a physical violence--this power, which, then,!s 
physical, brutal, whioh--as we shall se.--alao funotions 
brutally, this power that belongs to no on., that Is no hltm. 
that, in t:.is sen •• , is something like gravity thltt ~ ... 
the l1teless mass ot the star in its oourse--this power 1. 
the Iso01&1 power.' And 'soolal power' tunotiona In the 
coercion that is tusage. t19 
At first glanoe, the state appears as something abstraot, im-
personal, distant. ot oourse, in a oountry oonsoious or its demo-
oratic gove~nt, people will say that who commands and forbids 
Is the people, all of us, beouas. we are the·· state. But what part 
i 
or dimension of us? Certainly not our private or even interperson 
a1 lite. Yet to say that usages, in general, exeroise ooeroion in 
the rorm of politioal foroe would not be true. The family, the 
school, and many other sooial institutions that are souroes of 
usages, exeroise a moral coeroion acoompanied at times by physical 
torc.. Ortega has to introduce here another distinciton in the 
so01al taots, n'his shows us ••• that usagea can be classified as 
'weak or strong. t 'rheae two degrees of force in usage are meas-
sured by the toroe manitested In the accompanying ooeroion."20 
strong usages have to do with publio opinions and vigeneias, Vi-
genoiaa are alao called norms and they bear a strong moral sup-
port. They are the main oonstituents of publio opinion. Ortega 
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desoribes this phenomenon as follows: 
Both these things- ... being an lml)fM~,_r. aDd being a reoours .. 
implJ that sooiety is, in essenoe, power, and insUperable 
power faoing the individual. ;:'ublic opinion, 'reigning' 
opinIon, has this power behind it and makes it funoiton 1n 
the various forms that corresopand to the various dimensions 
of oolleotive existenoe. This nower of the oollectivity i. 
publio power.21 . 
At th$ bog1nrdng this privilege of using physical coeroion 
tor the sooi£), oontrol of usages 1s lei.'t out to the private re-
sponsibll:1ty of: the tribe and the oommunity. But as time goes 
on an~ soclety grows in number and complexity, physioal power 
beoomes institutionalized. rEhestate is the substitution for th18 
power ot the oommunity.22 
When the realm of physioal foree becomes institutionalized. 
the power in the hands of a rew tends to inorease and eorrapt it 
there is no social control over it. Vv.hatever form this sooial 
oontrol takes on, it will always be &1$11'ioial if it is not based 
on the social fUnction and nature at the state. According to 
Ortega liberalism 1s the only politioal rl;:>ctrlne that respeots 
thLa~soolal function and nature of the s~at •• 23 His arguments in 
~ 
, 
o., •. ":-.mse of l1beralism:'are based on sooial:. considerations ot its 
t 
21I bid., p. 269_ 
22ortega, ~ ~ people, j. 269. 
23ttv1eja y nueva po11tica", Obras Completas, I (Madrid, 195,;) 
288. 
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socio-historical origin and meohani sm. iJ've skip thi s part of 
ortega's thought becuase it 1s fairly known and could induoe many 
to rejeot his whole politioal sooiology, whioh_ for the most !,Rl't. 
oan be considered independent of his political~!tlon8. 
'rhe important point to be considered in all this doctrine of· 
usages and strong vigencias is that the po~ical racts are based 
on culture, Nowadays, used to the bureaucratization of modern 
states, we tend to oonsider the government as a mere instrumental 
and aWninistrative organization anat is able to solve all its do-
astia or internal problems in its own sphere. Ortega says about 
public opinion on which the state is oonstituted. It Our social 
environment, \'lThich is full of words, of things said. is ~ ipso 
full or pplnlons. tt 24 These opinions are most intimately culture 
in the i'ull sense of the word. Culture is what '.va take for grant 
e~ and what is thought to be the common beliet of a country. And 
it is the biding force and coercion of this belier that .onsti-
tutes the state. 
-
If we contemplate the countless ideas or opinions that for-
ever hover and buzz around us ••••• we shall observe that they 
can be divided into two great classes. some of them are 
said as something that is self-evident and in saying them 
the speaker is conf1dent from the outset that they will be 
accepted by what is called teVer.1Dodyt. Other ideas or 0-
p1n1ons, on the contrarr. are uttered with the more or lese 
definite suggestion that they are not accepted opinIon., or 
sometimes as oompletely and confessedly opposed to con~only 
accepted op1nlohs.n25 
ortega goes on show1ng how afraid PtoPle are of disagreeing 
. 241W4 .. .,,, Jh .. ··264. 
25 
57 
with "everybody" and means that they do not need support and baok-
ing from partioular individuals or groups,. but tha" on the con-
trary they impose themselves on everyone."26 
!!!!. Gultural approach.l2 Eolltioal facts: This cultural or socio-
logioal approach to po]tics is what makes Ortega wr1te: "The gov-
erning classes during oentur1ea--save for a short per1od--have 
ruled wrongly not beoause of chance, but because the Spa1n thoy 
were ru11ng o\"er, was as siok as they." In other words, the 
problems in po11tics. that are transcendent and not maeely spora-
dic, are the result ot more profound soc1010g10al tactors. s~oolo­
logioally spe~tng, society 1s polarized around a minority and a 
majority. The oause of the ill functioning or the society oan be 
the laok ot a good minority, 'or the lack ot respect for them on 
the side of the lajoritJ together with lack of docility and dis-
cipline. A great number of t oda,.18 political problems do not re-
sult from economio end political -,urces alone, but from forget-
ting about this f~ct' whioh Ortega mentions. One of the main tac-
tor. tor lnter.na~nal political decisions lies outside the pol-
itical &phe" and belongs to the p~oblem of understanding the 
national character of eaoh country. What i$ the reality of this 
national character according to Ortega? Is it l type ot cammon 
mind of person? The national character Is oonstituted by some 
oommon beliefa of a countryts people about what should constitute 
their speCial wa,. of lite. public opinion, over a period of many 
• 
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rears, constItutes a national credo to which people submit. The 
$\ibm.sion 1s not an automatic process. but depends ontha a.bili-
ty or the minority to rule and on the correct use cf physical 
force that, by lts very nature, loa. along with public opinion. 
Ph;pJical force ~ .2 state: Physical force, aocording to Ortega 
is never something to be looked down upon. The Philosophy of 
physical .fo;t-ce is more complicated than appears a.t rlrst sight. 
Society, we:1:siad before, is al\'V'ays a. Victory of the sooial forces 
against the ''ll +;1«ocial. vJhat philosophers say about the social 
nature of man, says Ortega, could also be said about the antisoci-
al nature of man. 27 "A tone time or ano ther, tt he wrl te S, n almo s t 
-
all men have felt longings to flee from society. But the vivid 
image of the effort implied by a solitary lite ••• is enough to sup-
press the impulse to flee. tt28 Ortega examines the tendency to se-
clusion from society as the natural way by which societies are 
born and expanded. Jmat keeps society together is the coercion 
that usages exercise upon the individual, and this coercion samep 
times cannot be moral alone but must depend on the ability of the 
minorities to use physical force in an intelligent way. People 
are born, says Ortega, when they have the _will to do so. But tht", 
will will does not arise spontaneously. Rather it is imposed to 
27 Ortega, !!.!l ~ Peop 1e, p. 227. 
28Ibid • 
• • 
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the mass pressed upon it "like the oil in the automobile. f1 
With the foregoing motapolitioal basis that sociology has 
provided, Ol"tega examines a number of political phenomena. lie 
will only mention the three most important ones, namely the oon 
oapt of nation, the sociology of war, and the revolt of the mas 
~ Revolt 2£.2 l¥1asses ~ .!!:! theory about ~ nation: In his 
The Revolt of: the Masses ortega rejects the old definitions of th ......... __ .r 
nation f:or f:ailing to provide us with the real origin and consti-
tution of a c01llltry. They rather pointed out a.ccidental factors 
which usually accompany the notion of nation, 
The oommon origin of the people Wi thin the boundarie s of one 
country Was one of the points the ancients emphasized most. The 
Romans. for instance, called their VO'Wltry ian'!_ "Itft , namely 
the state, n is not a horde or a tribe or other societie:3 based 
on consanguinity which nature takes on itselr to rorm w:f.thout 
the collaboration of human effort. tt 29 Not only has the m.odern 
phenomenon of the birth of countries like switzerland and Canada 
denied this conoeption, but so also has the very beginning of 
Western civilisation. Rom.anization is an old concept and an ex .. 
ample of what we call today nationalizatiion. It Illeans the unity 
c. 
within ona state tt suCh different countries as Spain, France. 
England, and Africa. So Ortega. rightly stat eSI ItOn the contr&l7. 
the state begins when man strives to esoa.pe from the natural soc-
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iet,- of which he has been made a member by blood.",o 
Another main oonoeption of nation oonsists in wr.at bas been 
oalled the natural boundary theory_ Thle theory state. that what 
oonstituted the modem nationalities was a result of a long pro-
oess of wars and oonquests between countries, During these ~r" 
they had natural hindrances for their campaigns against other 
tribes and province._ These hindrances were the natural boundar·· 
les that exist today between the different nations. ortega finds 
two thing. wrong with this position: 
The historic reality of the tnatural bJundary' consist s sim-
ply in beine a hindrance for the expansion of the countt'y A. 
and over country B. Because it is a hindrance for-the co~ 
try A, is also a defense for B. The idea of 'na.~iU. bound.' 
a1'1t. implies naively, as more natural even than tl';e ol"Ul1dary! 
the possibility ot: an unlimited expansion and tusion between 
countries. As it seems, only a natural hindranoe is an ob-
st~ole to them.;l 
~ll1il!:r:ly Ortega refeots the theory that defines nation in 
" ...... .,." ,:j,. 
terms of so11, language, etc •• All these definit1ons, Ortega 
th.t;. '.:",,_ hii';iG btcJ main d1ffioulties. First, they are factors exter-
nal to the life of the nation. We have to look !'or a justifioatiOl 
of the state, in 1ts daily life. beoause it 1s a human reality and 
as such it mu?t have a self-explanation, in the way it operatas. 
"It is neoessary to resign oneself to look for the seoret of the 
30orteg~, LfEebelion ~!!! masaSA p. 137. 
31Ib1d. 
-
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national state in its peculiar inspiration as such state, 1ri it. 
own policy and not in some foreign principles of a biographIcal 
or geograph1calOha»acter."32 But besides being peripheral, those 
old deflnitions are static end belong to the past not to the pre-
sent. The state is not something estatic, but a movement. It 1s 
something that either inoreases or deoreases. Like the sooiety 
it is founded upon, it is mobile. If we out this movement by 
means of abstractions, we will only see the terminus.a quo of the 
movement. The essence of the state, in this case, will 9.pT'·:1'lI' a.a 
a uni'ty of people which is found on a material thing like idiom, 
blood, boundary. But if we look into the future we i~~ediately 
see that this community which we have called state, iR striving 
towards sor,ne end. More than that .. 'in this projec,t. it tries to 
overcome that unity of the past, which we thought constituted the 
state itsel:f. lfJben the drive toward the future dies, the state 
itself ceases to exist. That is why all the \ttl1tie~s of the past 
were definitions of the state before the Sta~A was accomplished. 
but now they are realities and rea.lities can no longer be ideal. 
and goal •• 
The word ideal, therefore, is the keystone according to Or-
tega, in all this definition of the state, "The state is, no mat. 
ter what:t!s form may be, the invitation that a group of men ma.ke. 
to other human groups, to exeoute together a great enterprise.-33 
But this doe. not mean that the past i. irrelevant here. It only 
amo'Lttlts to saying that it is important inasmuc!l as it influences 
the tututre. With the countries ot South America, ortega Inslsts 
Spain has a common paat, but since i.t doe. not share with them. 
a oommon project or future, the7 do not oonstitute one nation wit 
Spain, The past, aocordlng to Ortega, makes ua irreversible be. 
ings, History 1s never a repetltion, because h"ltoJ'1 is an ex-
perienc<9 and men do not like to oop7 In hi stor'J. 
The European has been democrat, 11beral, absolutist, and 
feudal. , • but he no longer ~. ~ S!.ll this • Doe • thai mean the t he 
does not o«lt1nue in any W&y being tho.e thing.? Clear17 not. 
'I'he European cont1nu.e. being all those thlnga, but he ls them in 
the form ot having been them.34 
Thls oan al.o be applied to the national levelt 
To have common glorle. in the palt, a common will in tbe preeent J 
to can7 out great thinge together, wanting to do .ome mON thiDSS 
b~lH)ld the $8s80t1al conditlons to become a count!'J. In the palt. 
inheritance. and glories; in the future, one progr .. to realis •••• 
Tho axiatenoe ot a count17 ls a dailY' plebiscite.35 
~tfhat is the nature ot thls program that the state alwaYI pre-
suppose.' liThe program i. a suggestive project ot common 11t •••• 
33Ib1d • p. 1'9. 
;4orteia,~ hombre.7.!fsante, p_ 16~. 
1955~~~7!ga, ttIUstoria como sistema,- Obras Completas, VI (Madr1<\ 
they," that is the oitizens, "do not live only in oammon for the 
sake of living in common, but rather to carry out something to-
gether.":;6 Ortega mentions here the oonquests and expansion of 
the Roman empire as something that oaused the strong national 
unity of the Romans. 37 ~lben the imperialistic fervor was strong, 
Rome had a cause that just iried its own ex! stence. When this 
spirit died, Rome oeased to exist. In Invertebrate spain, he 
desoribes a similar prooess or expansion that oreated the Span-
ish national unity.;S Since those are the only examples he gives 
of the so-oalled program of oommon 11fe, his notion of nation 
seems to be restrioted to tho.. oountries that possessed a 001-
onial or imperialistio goal in history. 
~ 80ciolo8'1 2!.!!!:.!. The sociology of war of Ortega is an ap-
plication of his notion of physioal foroe to the national and in-
ternational level. Ortega thinks that today's fear of war--he 
wrote these ideas at the beginning of the oentury--is irrational. 
Be oriticizes seve3iy a type of paoifism originated in England 
that wanted to avoid any type ot war at all costs. such an at. 
titude, Ortega writes, comes trom oonsidering physical vilence 
as the only reality in Wd. "I belIeve," he continues, "that the 
;6Ortega, ~ rebelion ~ !!! masas, p.l4l. 
l 37 Ortega, t:I Apuntes sobra el pensamiento, au terurgia y de-
miurgia," Obras Oompletas, II (Madrid, 1944), 537. 
;80rtega, ~ rebe1ion ~ !!! masas, j~ 130. 
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terrible thing about war is that it is a puniShment inflioted up. 
on the Europeans for not having tbought out oalmly about the na-
ture of war." 39 Violenoe is only a manifestation of the wills 
end powers that came into conflict in a war. War is not, in most 
of the oases, the brute dominance of force over intelligence and 
reason, but rather the external manifestation of a conflict of 
wills and programs between two oountrles.4o The determination 
of a society to oarry out a program of common life, and the min-
orityts exercise of aubhority, both require if noces&ary the use 
of force if necessary. More than t hat, physical force if the 
bes~ indication of the determination of this majority and author-
ity to overcome all obstacles and bring about its goal. People 
are born and heard this expression before when they have the in. 
domitable will to do so; and this will is not firm if it does not 
want to risk everything. ltWar is not the exercise of power by 
one state, thus in general, but the concrete determination to ex-
ercise such power by means of violence and coercion.ul~l Ortega 
goes as far as saying that if any mono-determinism should be held 
a.s an explanation oJ:" history, it would not be the geographic de-
terminism of Buckle or the economic determinism of Marx, but the 
monodeterminism of war.41 War is the dynamic prinoiple of his-
40ft Invertebrate Spa.in", Obras Completas, II (r,iadrld, 1954), 
41ortega, "El genio do la guerra y la guerra alemana," Obras 
~~~ta:.!8~1 II (Madrid, 1958), 205. 
"Sombre e1 i'ascismo " Obras C 
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toXT; something natural. to it, just as the natural functIon ot 
any organism. But this does not just mean that war is not a 
sorrowful experience and should not be avoided wh6n it is not ne 
88Sary. "WtU'!' causes fatigue but not extenuation, it 1s a natura 
function of the S oeia1 organism already prepared for thIs f'uno-
tion. n43 
The periods of war are periods of croatlvity and national! 
formation. DUring such peri:ds the usages of S oeiety ohange. 
periods of peaoe are times of adaptation of the sooia1 1n~ti-"i " 
tiona to the political 8hang.s~ introduced by previous w~r~. 
is not hlat.rioal initiative or o'l'eativIty, but a manifestation 
of the soll.ity and determination of sdciety to remain unified. 
Ortega is just as much ags.inst the modem theories of direct 
aotion and government based on the mere Use of for'ce, as he is 
against a b]'ind pacifism. The former position its a mchiern phen-
omenon callad Nazism and Fasolsm that claims no other right,. 
than violence without even bothering about a rationalization ot 
its own position. 'lJhese modern political theol"ies and the re-
-
volt of the masses are one a.nd the same thing. "Under the 
--------
of syndioallsm. and Fascism there appears for the first time in ..:.:';1' 
430rtega., tiEl genio de 1a guerra. ., 1& guerra alemana," 40. 
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Europe a type of man who doe s not want to gi vo reasons or to be 
right, but simply shows himself resolved to impose his optnlons~ 
The latter position departs from a statio oonception of society. 
war is only a means to maintain a status guo,. Paoifism. shows a 
oomplete ignoranoe about the whole historical pr~oess of nation-
" 
formation, which is a prooess ot oonf1iot between raGes resulting 
1n war. This theory oonsiders the present status guo as a natur-
al and perennial state. Even aooepting the taot that, atter the 
formation of the present nationalities war should disappear. what 
should we say about some oountries that appear late in history 
when all nationalities are fonned? :.abo is going to determ.ine the 
boundaries of suoh countries, or how many nations there Should 
be? pacifi~ errs when it oonsiders international sooiety as an 
equilibrium whioh is not a balance of powers b~ a statio ooncep-
tion whiCh is the negation of 1if •• 45 In all this discus8ion ar-
tega oonfesses himself a follower ot Kant, Fidbte, Schelling, 
and espeoia1ly sohe11er. H. disagre •• with the latter regarding 
hi. ethic,a1 po£Ction. 
In spite ot his rejection of the Darwinian conception ot 
war, prevailing in hi s time, ortega t. po 8i tlon 1 s heavily intl". 
44Ortega, !!!!. Revo1! .2!. ~ Mas.e., p. 80. 
45 Ortega .. _ftwotas del vago estl0," Obrlls gomp1etas, II Uta-
drid, 1954), ~8. 
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enced by the biological discoveries of his time, a tact that 
seems to function signifioantly in the main arguments enumerated 
before. 
Ppysical torce ~ Rights. ortega-. SoeioloSl ~~ However. 
Ortega does not think that the main question about war has been 
solved with his for.goin::; arguments. He believes that todaY'll in 
deoisionsabout the use of torce 1s the s1gn of • lack of so11d 
ideas regarding a more profound reality: the juridioal aspect. 
During the spell and centuries a group of Frenoh people and Eng-
lISh philosophers suddenly disoovered the existence ot oertain in 
alienable rights and dttle. that men had just by being born. Al 
though th.clatmed that those rights and obligations existed pri 
to the state, yet, without the presence of the latter, the •• 
rights seemed to be complet~~y meanin~~e.s. JUst as in the time 
ot Rome, the peole derived all their social status from. their 
oitizenship, so also is the ian 01' the post-French revolution 
powerless to exercise any of ~s rights without the permanent 
"  
vigilance ot the Stat4h Thi.~ "original doctrine" of the rights 
\; 
of man was a oopy ot the discqvery made by the Romans, an d ig-
nored the long experience at _'hievementa in history. This at-
titude consisted also in a reJ~tion of the spirit ot the MIddle 
\~ 
" 
Ages whioh were considered as a~period of barbarism. These Eigh-
teenth Oentury thinkers committ~ two errors. The first consist. 
eda notion of progress .s a neg~ion ot the historical past. 
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"Progress does not consist in today' a annihilation of yesterday, 
on the contrary, it consists in conserving the &ssenceof yeater-
day that had the power to dreate a better today.n45 
The second error had to <b with a false idee, about barbarlam. 
A IS we said before, barbari am for Ortega's not only a. pe riod of 
lawlessness and lack of normative bounds. 1~is is the negative 
side of barbarism. Byt the". is I~mcther' "l~de, ct'''llplately forgot-
ten b7 the philosophers of ,the XVIII Century, namely, the aspeQt 
of creativity. Ortega predicted that our ideas on the Middle ASPS 
were going to c...'1.ange wi thin a short time, and history has proved 
him correct on this point. Again, the Middle Ages are the period 
of nationality formation and nationa1ttr ohange. 
Since the tL~e of Spencer, Ortega continues, the spirit ot 
war has been opposed to the sp 1ri t of industrialism in the same 
~ 
way as barbarism is opposed to culture_ The spirit of war con-
sists basically in the attitude of creativity that far from dis-
regarding the'danger; does not consider this danger as a suffici-
ent motive to avoid a great enterprise. The 1n1u3tt1~pir1t;"on 
the other hand, ie se affected b,.:fear of war that it risks noth-
~ng an d looks at war a threat tpylng 'to subvert the sta.tu,ir guo. 
The spirit of war, though affected by fear of war in a rational 
way, still considers its own determination to carry out a ereat~. 
450rtega, "Notas del vago estio," Obras Oompletasa II (Iadztt 1954), 428. 
social plan, above the danger of war. Life is conceived as a 
permanent vigilance.. The period o£ barbarism is a period of 
selfconj!ldenee. Decadence is just the opposite. Vie are not con-
fident because we have lost the power of self-determination that 
opens new historical paths. V~ only want to keep a statio bal-
ance. War is considered as a mere t~at, and militari£M is our 
tool against it. "The Middle Ages,n says Ortega, "did not know 
militarS-ame The military man is a degeneration of the warrior 
corrupted by industrialism."46 - The concept of physical £orces 1 
the Middle Ages is based on the ,principle: he who cannot de£end 
his right, cannot claim the right. The knight oannot rely on th 
state for thB security of his own rights beoau.e publis life, in 
the Middle Ages, was almost non-existent. The king only solves 
the most difficult cases of violation of, and con£lict between, 
right., Private life 1s identified with publio life. The Mid-
dle ASS' are personalist. Rights are a gift and noble dignity 
bestowed to the knight for his personal victories. This concep-
tion of rights is fully resented in the castles, saJs Ortega. 
"The castles symboli"e a daily struggle, life as a warfare.,,47 
In the Middle Ages humanity makes the discovery of self-discip-
line, braveness, and gentlenes. that noble wa. always engender •• 
460rtega, "Notas del vago estio,n'Obrs.. Complets.a, II (Ma-
drid, 1954), 429. 
47Ibid • p. 427. 
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All these virtues were virtues of the citizen. during the time 
of Rome; now they belong to the individual a8 a private man. They 
have travelled from the periphery to the oore of the people. Tne 
important point to be remembered in this whole treatise, is the c ... "f 
conception of rights in a dynamic faShion. 
With the backround offered by these sooio-historical oonsid-
erations, the author attaoks the complicated problem of interna-
tional peace and international rights. The rights of the state 
considered as a pe rson. should be oompared to the nature of rightl 
of the individual. Tbe readiness of one state to defend its own 
rights is the best indioation or its ability to rule. nThis power 
does ~ot consist in an intelligent, aX"~iatioJ or indusi#t'1al cap .... 
acity. Nothing of this sort cons·titut •• the specific power ot 
the state. The power is rather a peculiar kind of ene:rgy'and 00-
hesion among those who form a count:ry and among the different col 
leotlvities that are conquered. The long and painful proce •• ot 
discoverr of rights 'during the Middle Ages., produoed future re-
sults in the creation of national constitution. in the XVII and 
XVIII centuries. The people, however, who wrote these constitu-
tions never looked back to the so-called ttBarbaric" ages that 
made possible the ~mola reality of rights. One of the most ad-
vanced countries in the philosophy of rights Is England, accord-
ing to Ortega. England produced an unwritten const1tution that 
became a model for many nations. The development of suoh a con-
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oonstitution required great oonquests and wars, life oonc~ved as 
a daily stuggle. BJ.t the great paradox is that England, wholly 
oblivious of its own past, has evolved the mod.ern doctr:~ne of 
pacifism, whioh is a denial of her own historical experiences. 
In the opinion of Ortega, all modem doctrines ot interna-
tional right have failed to prevent war because of the basic erlOr 
in the conception of individual rights that 1s extended to the 
state. The only solution for international peaoe must be a dyna-
mic and historical oonception of rights as an aohievement, and 
the idea of physical force as the best indioation to keep these 
rights. This rather simplified conclusion of Ortega the histori-
cal and dynamiC origin of rights probably oontained in his mind 
a great deal of ramifioations, but since he hever made them ex-
plicit, his eooio10gy of law and war, ends up in a very simjle 
solution. 
Social and political consideration about the Revolt of the Masse •• 
- -- -- -
The Revolt of the Masses is one of the best known and oom-
............ ------_ ....... -
mented works of Ortega, and therefore we will limit ourselves 
to make a rundown of his leading ideaa. This will be most in ao-
cordanoe with the purpose of this study whioh ia to give an ao-
oount of the .o~iologr ot Ortega never exploited by his commenta-
tors. 
Revolt of the Masses is the name Ortega uses to oharaoterize 
---------
the great mass-movement of the beginning ot this centurJ that oon 
sisted in the "aooession of the masses to complete 800ial pOWf_··~ 
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er.n48 The revolt of the masses has ohanged completely the mod. 
ern European way of lif5. All the other political and social 
changes must be oonsidered unimportant when they are compared to 
the former mass-movement. Its oauses are hidden in the Eighteen-
th and Nineteenth centuries) more sPecifically in the dootrines 
of liberalism, scientifio expertaentation, and industrialism. ~ 
coming of the masses to power has produoed a type of man that 
Ortega oalls the mass-man, with the following features: an out-
--
look on life with all its technologioal and cultural prorl').C~S, a.s 
a seoond nature; something that man finds out-there, and that he 
has a right to. with oomplete inadvertence to the saorifices and 
struggles tha t humanity haa gone throl18h to create. As a conse-
quence the mass-man looks at his riehts as things of oaprice with 
--
no regard to the fundamental facts that at all times should give 
value to them. The mass-man is rebellious by nature. ~e has no 
--
docility to the minority for which he has no respect whatever. 
Life for him becomes something common that has los~ all the 
of lIte created by the scrifices of the ruling minorities. The 
. . 
ba.sie a.ttitude is that of a "spol1ilq,lchildtt that considers his 
as necessary as as his food, as something he has a right to,just 
because they lie there.49 The ma~"-l'"''''4 is·tm manvmo looks tor 
"--
a definition of what he 1s in the crowd, who 1s nobody outside 
480Ft.ga, La rebelion de las mases, p. 11. 
- --_ ......... 
49 Ibid., p. 90. 
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the crowd. Be learns bow to do everything as other paople do. :S:e 
has no opinions of his own. In the world of the masses, quanity 
repalces quality and crowds begin to invade theaters and meeting-
halls.50 Authority becomes a mere representation o~ the masa-spi~ 
it. Bureaucratization means the disappearance of the ruling min-
ority and the use of authortty 13.:3 a weapon in the hands of the 
mass. The natural basia on ~mich society is foUbd the minority-
majorityrelatlon, authority and exemplarity, docility and deter-
mination to live in common are placed by the reir.:;h 0:' the masses. 
Basically the rebellion of the masses is the corruption of demo-
cracy envisaged by TocQueville.51 The lack of initiative and norma 
·.a natural result of a society where authority is not esteemed~­
and practivally the :Lack of complete cultural values characterized 
by the coming of the masses result in these three facts synthesiz-
ed by Oromi: "Free expansion of vital desires. 2) Radical ingrat-
itude towards the rest or humanity. 3) Deep conviction that nebo 
is superior to anybody.n52 
Together with all these factors, there is the barbarism of 
. -
specialization.53 Per)ple have not only lost the notion o~ history 
5l Tocquevll1e, Democracy ~ America, (New York,) pp.258-261. 
520roml, Ortega y la Filosotia, ed. E.T. Cruz (Madrid, 1953), 
p.252. 
530rtega, ~ Revolt ~ ~ Masses, p. 119. 
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and time, but they are no longer able to oomprehend the weltan-
aohauung of their politico-sooial realities. The mass-man 1s not 
an ignorant man, a worker, or any speoial olass member and this 
makes it 80 much more the difficult. "By mass •• is not to be spec 
ially understood the wOJ."k~r8; it does not indlopte a social ola.~ 
but a ktnd of man to be found today in all social classes, who 
consequently represent. our age, in whioh he is predominant, ~l. 
ing pcwer.I~54 The typioal way the mass operates Is by imposing it 
own rule with irrational force. The sole po11tical teohnique of 
masses is direot action. The masses not only intervene every-
where; they 00 so violently, says Ortega. The re~son for this ia 
the lack of "Auditive faculties."55 ~~en thi~ Is missing, cul-
tUre disanpears. 
l!..!hen all these thing~ are lacklne there Is no culture; there 
is, in the strictest sense of the word, barbari~. And let 
us not deceive our~elves, this Is what is beginnln::; to app 
in Europe under the progressive rebellion of the masses ••• 
Barbarism is the absence of standards to which appeal can be 
made.56 
The state becomes the uncontrolled ruling force, the tyran-
1cal rule of' the ljaJority. Instead of revolut10ps now there is 
only left a coup ~t !!!! that changes the subject of government 
without changing the basic form and nature ot the state. 
54Ibid •• p. 120, 
55 Ibi9t" 
56ortega; ~ Revolt ~ ~ Masses, (New York, 1938), P. 79. 
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Since 1949, that is to say, slnce the beglnnlng ot the second 
gene~atlon or bu~geol. iovernments, there have been no genu-
Ine revolutlons In Europe. Not assuredly because the~e w.~e 
no motive. tor them, but because there were no menae.. pub-
blle power was brought to the level of soolal power. Good-
bKe-foreve~ Revolutions. The onlz thing now possible y;--
t eir opposite: £be ooup ~'!!!!.5·( 
The result is the oreation ot a State that ls based on pure 
physioal force, like Bazlsm, Pasclsm and Bolah.visa, During the 
time of the great phl10sophical developments in Bad German,-. we 
had scientist. and philosophers detendlng with the most limpliat. 
io reasons the rightness' ot their government, who philoaoph,. .. s 
the most ridiculous in hIstory. ThIs total lack of norm, tyPIcal 
of barbarIan, Is not as In the other periods' ot creativit,., be-
caus. the mas. does not have an,. plan, doe. not want lDlything.l' , .. , 
Decadence 1. a relative concept. Ifattons become, decadent with re-
spect to oertaln ideals the,. Intend to realize. But absolute de. 
cadenoe is the lack of enthuslalll1 about lite, because of a laok at 
program and inItiative. 
The oharaoteristic ot our hour is that the commonplace mind, 
knowing it.elt to be commonplaoe, has the assurance to pro-
olalm the rights of the oommonplace and to impose them where-
ever it w.1l1. As the,. say in United States: .to be difterent 
is to be indecent.58 
Ortega thinks that the soolal situation i. very serious but 
not an insolUble problem. Yet he realizes that all solutions have 
been superficial because they have be.n applIed in the mere peri-
phe17: in the poli tioal sphere. The solution he prop:ae. is the 
57Ibld., p. 131. 
58o~tega, !!!! Revolt!!!. the Masses, p. 18. 
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European state, based on a common culture and normative system--
all these are socio-cultural and historical tacts, Ortega write.--
that the west has to re-discover in its own history. He believes 
that the national ditferences are minimal as compared with the 
community in history ot Europe. His unification of the west i. 
treated extensively in his sociology of law, and is made dependent 
on the dynamic conception of law that depends, in its turn, on a 
historical consoiouaness that has to be aroused everywhere. This 
will bring Europe to the discovery of an identity in culture and 
especially with regard to the formation and development of the 
doctrine of rights of man. This will also help societies to re-
discover the powerful minority and to accept its ruling role. 
Only with the fulfillment of these conditions can a new society 
be born and the revolt of the ms.sses fade. 
-----
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CRAPTER IV 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE OF ORTEGA 
General considerations about ~ Sooiology 2£ Knowledge: The 
soc1010S1 £! knowledge is a relatively new field in sooiology. 
Marx was the initiator of the sohool, but the main systematio 
treatment appeared with the work of Mannhe11l., Ideolo,," !.2!!. utopiaJ 
He was the one Who ooined the term, Wissenssoziologie. The Engli. 
translation of this German term, sooiology ~ knowledge, aocord-
ing to Maquet, expands the somewbat restrioted German notion and 
includes not only soientifio knowledge but any type of thought-
product.2 This English term seems to apply better to what most 
sooiologists of knowleQie have been doing. "The SOCiologists of 
kn~wledge have not limited their inquiries to soientific know-
ledge.n 3 
The sooiology of knowledge explores the existential basi. of 
knewledge. nThe Coopernican revolution," says Merton, !tin this 
area ot inqui~ consisted in the hypothesis that not only error 
(this was the hypothesi. of Marx) but also the disoovery of truth 
was sooially (historically) <landi tioned.,,4 Different philosophi-
lIde.logy and Utopia (New York, 1960), Mannheim, Karl. 
2Maquat, The 100!OlOil of Knowledge, translated from the 
Frenoh by J.P.~cke, lBos on; 1951), p. 4 • 
• Ibid. 
h'Robert Merton.Sooial rrheorY' and aoola1 st~~ lGlAn ~'J:RI 
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cal schools have emphasized, throughtout hiet0rJ, the logieo-cul-
tural ori.in of thought. The very definition of philosophy as the 
seience studying the ultimate principles of things under the light 
of natural reason. does not seem to explicitate the fact that such 
natural reascn belongs to P~Qple who- ~re living in a socio-cultur-
al milieu. 
We do not want to limit ourselves to philosophical thought 
and we should arrive at the same conclusion with regards to scien-
ces, art, and any area of human knowle~ge. Thought circumscribed 
to its social context had never been given special consideration. 
In the beginning of his Ideology ~ Utopia, Mannhelm talks about 
the directive principles of this social science. "This book is 
concerned with the problem of how men actually think."5 So far 
history of ideas w~s the only science encharged of establishing 
relationships between phi::bsophioal and literary ideas and histor-
ical phenomena. The central thesis of the socioloiY of knowledge 
is that the history of idea. is still incomplete. In order to 
have an adequate historical knowledge of ideas we have to consid-
er scientifically their socio-cultural dimension. The social de-
terminant:'ot knowledge--what is called by Mannheim the group-de-
terminant ot knowledge--can be restricted to small groups or to 
a whole culture or historical epoch. 6 In anr case the historical 
5 Mannheim, Ideology ~ Utopia. p. 1. 
6 IbId., p. 118. 
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factor will also have to enter into oonsideration. "Manifestly, 
then, the sc:d.ology of knowledge is coneerned with problems which 
have had a long history. So muoh is this the case, that the dis-
cipline has found its forst historian, Ernst Gruenwald."? And 
Mannheim saYSI 
The ph1losophy of history whioh mostly treats histor1cal pe~ 
lods as units, overlooking their inner differentiation and 
stratification, must be sUpplemented by a socially different· 
iqted view of the historico-socil process as a whole, expli-
citly taking into acoount the distribution of social roles 
and its significance for the dynamics of the whole.8 
The sociology of knowledge was first disoovered, as .e said 
before, by Marx. In his German Ideology, he set out to demonstratt 
that the hlstoico-soclal envilDlment of a class or a historical •• 
oonam1u system influenoes a determinate Lfdeology to the point o~ 
the latter being a tool for the conservation of the former in a 
determinate economic system. There is a long lapae between thia 
narrow ideological determinism of Marx and Sorok!n's work, Cultur-
!! prnamios.9 In this interval we >disoover Levy-Bruhl, Durkhe1m, 
Ricket, Troeltsch, all of whom were read by Ortega y Gssset. In 
7Merton, So01al Theo!l ~ Sooial stpuoture, p. 256. 
~arl Marx, German Idaol0§l. (New York, 194?), p. 20. 
9sorokln, so01al and Cultural Dynamios. III, (New York, 1937). 
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addition, Sorokin, Merton, and, Znaniecki have contributed detailed 
studies of special cases of the general theory of the sociology ot 
knowledge. After these preliminary oonsiderations we want to treat 
some of the main problems of the 800iology of knowledge~ 
We will Uy to po&nt out the main sources of divergenoe from 
the standpOint of the three elements that oonstitute a 80ci01087 
of knowledge: thought, existential basis, and the relationship be. 
tween these two. lO 
The first element ££ ~ socl010*l ~ Knowledge: Knowled~8 
With regards to thought, we have already sefiD how a certain 
'" 
precision of this concept resulted from the \YB.Y in whioij the Ger-
man notion of wisaensoz!ologle is translated into EngliSh. In 
general it can be atated that the sociology of knowledge is not 
concerned wIth those ways of thinklbi~' ;ClO talking that are soci-
ally irrelevant and p~s more attention to thinking-processes re. 
fleeted in ideologies. This term ideology points to a hlstorico-
social reference. It was used by Marx for the first time in this 
i' 
sense. :ith this name Marx directs a basic attack agalrist all 
preceding social and political systems born, according to him, 
wi thin a false social stl'ucture created by the struggle betwwen 
classes. V:Jhareby the concepti ideology ha.s taken on, in many post. 
erior sociological writings, the cOlmotat10n of rationalization 
• 
in defense of the interest s of one class or e oonomic system. "All 
lOri.quat, ~ Socl.logy !:!.. Knowledge, pp. 28 .. ,6. 
the ideas, true or false, have their origin and inspiration in 
the material oonditions of' man ~nd his life-struggle," says Marxl 
Marx will oal1 his system a soience, as opposed to ideolgy, and 
will make the objeot of this scienee treat and interpret all past 
ideologies. 
In oontrast with German philosophy whioh desoends from heave 
to earth, here we asoend from earth to heaven. That 1s to 
say, we do not start out trom what men say, imagine, or eon. 
ceive. We set qut from real aotive men, and, on the basis 
of their real llt."proce.sB, we demonstrate the development 0 
their ideologioAl reflexes and eohoes of this life.prooess.1 
Engel explained this general thesis ot Marx LIOdltying it wi 
his positivistico-logical style. Under such an influence, modern 
textbooks on oommunism read in the following way: 
If we deduoe dlfrernet ideological schemes not from 
but only through our minds, from the real work, and from 
pens in it, What this yields is not philosophy, but positive 
ca.13 
However, for Marx, the idea of a soience independent from 
any ideology involves, at times, more than one contradietion.14 
If his own criticism or past ideologies is also conditioned by the 
800ial and economio struotures of his age, how oan he expect to 
esoape his own arguments? Communism as a general interpretation 
of history oannot explain thnt history in a purely relativistio 0 
llKarl Marx, German Ideology, p. 14. 
12Handbook ~ Ma~xi .. (.ew Yo~k, 1953), p. 23'. 
Karl., MArx .. German Ideolo ,OJeYl York, 1947), p. 14. Handoook 01' •• 
determ1n1st1c fash10n. 
The ma1n polnt of all this d1soussion 1s that the term ideo-
logy in the Marx1st sense has too many ph1losophioal oonnotations 
- <. 
to 04 introduoed uncrel10ally into the field of empirical solence. 
Mannhe1m was the first to take pains at retormulating this Marx-
ist oonoept10n. He oreated a value-free terminology that oannot 
~ 
t 
suooumb with the tailure o~ a philosophical system. The notion 
ideology is sp11 t into these two 800iolog1cal oategories: ideo-
logy and utopia. We are nqt inte~sted here In the speoitio ter-
'; 
minology, for Ortega will ~fter great d1fterneces in this point 
but rather 1n the basis fo~ this distinotion of Mannheim. Ideo-
logr and utopia are d1tter~nttated not by a criterion of truth or 
:; , 
va11dIty , but by a sooialitunction. 
"I 
Here we reter to the ideology ot an age or ot a oonorete hIs 
orico-sooial group, e.g., ot a ol •• s, when we are ooncerned with 
the character1st1cs and oomposition ot the total structure ot the 
mind of th1s epoch or of this group.15 
And a fa! pages later: 
Only those ori .. ntations tran:toending real1ty w111 be referre 
to OJ' us as utopian which, when tijey pass over into conduct, tend 
r -
to shatter, whether partially or wholly, the order of things pre-
va1ling at the t1me.n16 
15Mannhe1m, Ideologz ~ Utopia, p. 56. 
16Ibid ., p. 192. 
It is important to notioe, therefore, that the word utopia 
does not correspond to what we dall myth, meaning an irrational 
beliet of sooiety,17 This distinotion between ideology and u-
topia marks the separation of philosophy from sooiology and makes 
Mannheim a sooiolog~st in spite of his philosophioal preoocupa-
tions. The philosophioal questiona that Mannheim thought should 
be treated in a sooiologr of knowledge are, first, the problem 
of weltansohauung, and seoond, the epistemological basis of this 
soience. With regards to the former point, we might say that a 
sooial psyohologist and an anthropologist oannot relate an at-
titude to a oonorete sooio-oultural situation unless they fully 
understand suoh an attitude. TIi. attitude, whioh is refleoted 
in sign. and behavior, will have to be interpreted. As a conse-
quence a communion with the oulture in question will be required. 
In the same way the sooiologist of knowledge who studie 8 thought 
patterns has a need to interpret them. This is S)mething that 
mere statistioal correlations oannot substitute for.. On the 
other hand, the sooiologist is a scientlet and not· a philosopher. 
SO the main differenoe will oonsist in the~e two points: 1) The 
socIologist inte~~t9d in the so01010gy of knowledge will try to 
understand, not to evaluate, the oorrelations between th~ught an 
l7As an example see MoIver, The Web ot Government, (New Yor 
1958), p. 4. or Cassirer, ~ Myth !2!! ~stat. (New Haven,1946) 
p. 6. 
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social strnoture •• 2) The understandIng of thought-products will 
onl,. be a -Pl-erequisite for further conclusions outside the scope 
of philosoph,.. 
?pistemological Bases The second problem with regards to the 
, first element of the sociology of knowledge: thought-process, is 
the epistemological question, Sociology- is not directl,. interest 
ed in the critical problem of knowledge, However, once we have 
establiShed a determinate relation between social facts and 
thought, we have indirectl,. made some philosophical statements. 
This i8 ~T Merton, following Mannheim, believe. that espitemo-
logy has to be treated in some wa,. within the metasociology ot 
IDlowl$dge.18 Maquet has also studied this problem extensively, 
but his interest 1s .-utte difterents "The relation between the 
sociology o£ knowledge and the philosoph,. of knowledge.,,19 The 
sociologists of knowledge are interested in the relation between 
sociology and philosoph,. onl,. in so tar as they have to solve a 
methodological problem and give validity to what-ever discoveries 
the,. intend to make. In a gener,l way we can say that the maln 
thesis of the sociology of knowledge does not necessarily impli-
cate a relativistic position in philosophy. It is true that 
-------------------
18Merton, Social TheorY and Social Structure p. 494. Mannhe 
Ideologz !!!..9. UtopIa, p ,270. -
19Maquet, !!!!. Soci.1081 .2! KIlow1ed§e, pp. 1~14. 
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Mannheimts re1ationism is a camouflaged relativism but this ls 
so beoause he does not distinguish too well between the sooial 
and the 10g10a1 faotors in thought. Soientifio and phi10sophios. 
work is limited in scope and interest by sooial factor., and 
even tends to accept with more ease this or that truth, but thl. 
does not mean that the desire for truth and valid knowledge is 
a pure myth. As sociologists, it is enough to know that some 
correlations can be established between thought and socio-cul-
tural tacts, and unless we find a one-to-one correspondenoe we 
cannot say that the sociology of knowledge is the onlyeXplana-
tion of truth and falsity. As a matter of fact, Mannheim him-
')utlf lett out the problem of true or ralse ideologies. 
!!!! second element 2.! .2 Sooioloil 2! Knowledge: !!!!. Ext.tentia 
Basis, The seoond element is the existentia basis. To Wbat 
eocio-cultural phenomena is thought related? The differano •• of 
solution to this question seem to be as wide as the sociologists 
of kowledge. Mannheim, in all the pages he devotes to the pro-
blem of the bases of knowledge, does not state clearly just what 
he means by his group-determinism. However, his studies about 
the influences of politio.1 groups with regards to their olasses 
and ideologies, seems to ofrer a vague answer to the question 
asked before. 
Merton alao noticed this tact. 20 A more concrete answer 1s 
glven--it seeas to me--by Znanieoki. but hls work does not 01'-
2~annheim.'1 analysis is limited, as well, by his failure tc 
.. J:lu ........ J ... ~ .. v "'~ ............ " ............................. v ....... u .......... "''''''''''''A ... """" ..................... "'''' .................. d 
!mowledge,"' Me'FCon, 'So'CIal Theory and Social structure, p. 498. 
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fer any explicit statement with rega~. to the methodologJ of the 
sociology of knowledge in general. The c~tegories, audience, pub-
blic, etc., as Merton says, could be taken as an attempt to dis-
crimin~te some of the irrelevant social facts in rel_tioD to mow-
ledge.2l Sorokln has give. more importance to the cultural deter-
minants of thought. 22 We Will see that his approaeh is closer to 
Ortega's. Merton claims that Sorokints oorrelation between -.r-
stems of truth and partioular soientific and philosophical trends 
of thought of one epooh, is' a tautology.2, Maquet answers this 
objection as follows: 
In certain senxe the establishment by the tacts of a meaning 
tul relationship may always be said tautological ••• aut then we 
must admit that only the discoveries ot inexplicable relationship 
(tm regard to the present state of the theoretical elaboration of 
a~olence) are not tautological.24 
Perhaps ortega offers a more conorete answer to this objeo-
tion of Merton. As we will see in the following pages, Ortega 
proposes a basic ideologtcal preepeotive or sensibility of lite 
2lIbid .,p. 482.' 
22sorokin, Sooia1 and Cultural Dynamics,III (New York,l9'7). 
--- - ---- ....... _---
2'Merton, 
24Maquet, 
Sooial Theory and Social struoture, p. 497. 
-
!!!! soojdogy 2.! Knowledge, p. 196. 
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of one epoch--the bellef-ay.'em of Sorokln Is thus more soclologl~ 
cal In nature--as related to partlcular manlfestatlons of art, 
polltical systems, and soclal aotion of a determlnate age. 
!!!!. thlrd element: Relation bet",'een thoUght-Erooesses ~ social 
b,s.~1 The type of relatlon that exists between the existential 
baais and thought-products can go from an exaggerated reallsm (as 
It would be the theory of a univeraal mlnd that crellte' the oult-
ural systems of truth) to the moderate positlon stating the mu-
tual influence of thought and culture upon one another and bypass 
ing other factors without denylng them. 
It is luffiolent that we can establish certain relatlon be-
, , 
tween these two ~~riables, social facts and knowledge, in order 
to justify a scientific trea~ent. Maquet chooses the relation 
of "causal conditlon." 
Necessary: when the constellation of sooial ciroum-
stanoes by which we define a fasci st group does not 
ext-it, the Ina'rtlculate conception of history never 
appear. 
~. deflnition, the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion 1s the olro\mlstance in the absenoe of which a 
faot oannot take place and whose presence always en-
ta:la a fact.25 
Another question is that which is conoerned ":t'l..; "'~e dir-
eotion of the relation between the two variables. Which the 
dependent and which the independent variable? Tlll the p~esent, 
time, the SOCiologists of knowledge have been almost exclusively 
'interested In one direction: that whieh treats knowledge as a de-
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pendent variable and the social basis as an independent variable. 
BUt the inverse direction of the relation, if it could b~ estab-
lished, would also fall within the limits of the sociology of kno. 
ledge. Ortegats treatment of beliefs and ideas offer an analysis 
of the functional oharacter of thought and ideologies, so that 
thought 1s treated as an independent varl.ble. He has studied 
the influence of soience, art, and philosophy upon the march and 
dynamiCS of socle~. 
orteS!s Soclologr £! Knowledge. ~ usase ~ belief. In the 
chapter about t·he social faots, we disoussed the appearanoe and 
nature of usages in a general way. Expanding s,~ewhat the notion 
of usages, we discover that they represent attitudes wnich in turn 
represent opinions. These social opinions ref5~ to the things a. 
t. 
round us, to sooiety, _ to our relation 'it th other peop1d and the 
~ 
world. They constitute what we may call beliefs and t~ey ar. our 
interpretation; of life. 
vvhen we dicover ourselves as existing in this world, we find 
ourselvea not only with things, but with people, not only in the 
world, but in society; and these people and that sooiety we hap-
en to live in, already have an interpre-tation of lite, a oomplex 
of ideas about the universe.26 
What is the social fUnction of these belief-systems? Let us 
remember that the usage is something impersonal and irresponsible. 
The individual r1seF up as an opponent of the usa~.s and there£ore 
26 
of sooiety. The way in whioh the individual oonstitutes himself 
as individual is by thi~king, by retiring to his own solitude 
(ensimiamandose). But in order to think by ourselves, we must 
depart from certain premises and unquestionable s truths. We must 
staDt from the known in order to arrive at the unknown. What hap-
pen to an savage that enters a modern faotory in order to learn 
how to wOl"k' It a man of our oulture takes on the same work, we 
will presuppose that he has a oompi1ation of oommon sense know-
ledge upon whioh we can bu~ld an explanation about the tools and 
machines with which he ~ supposed to work. But the savage has 
never seen a machine in h~ life. Our work of instructing him 
becomes almost impossible. ··lie do not know where to begin It only 
< 
when something has been thought out, falls under our possession, 
and on1y'when the elementary things are submitted to us, oan we 
go on to more diffiou1t things. n27 Men have to make oontinual1y 
important deciSions, not only of an individual, but also of a soo-
ia1 character. Thought is instrumental, acoording to Ortega, and 
is SUbmitted to aotion and life. We cannot ohoose irrationally 
and therefore the' inf1ni tEl possibilities for aotion must be pre-
viously limited and seleoted. \~'ho ma.kes this se1eotion for us, 
A sooia1 context of valu &s and norms; the weltanschauung of our 
I, 
27 Ortega, nMedltaoiones del !~uljote," Obras Completas, I 
(Madrid, 1953), 353. 
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age and oulture. This is a system of truth th~t enables us for 
social and politioal decisions as well. Before soienoe has de-
veloped in many areas, we must act and make political and social 
. ~. 
moves. This 8,Jstem of ballets is, accordin~ to Ortega, oulture 
Itself. 
Oulture, rigorously speaking is the system of ultimate 
oonviotions about li£e. Culture is what one believes 
"fiith unobjectionable .faith; a.bout the world ••• 
The totality of those convictions or 'ideas' is not 
marlufactured fictiiona,lly by the individual, but he 
reoetves them from his histo:r:-l.::al mili<;u.. 28 
ortega oalls this belier-systme ~e sooial do~a.~8 The 
social dogma offers to the ind\vidual a fpoint of departure for 
his oreative think1ng.30 
Charaoteristios of the Belief-~yst.m: 
-_ ..... l~ ____ 
To live ia to have to takEt care of something--the world 
and oneselt. But this wo~ld and this 'self' with which 
man is oanfronted, alread~ appear to him as organized 
under an ideologioal 1nte~retatioD about the world and 
himself. 11 ~ ,~ 
, 
The first charaoteristio (bout sooial dogma ~s that we do 
l, 
~ 
not think about them but deparuing from them. Beliefs are &0-
I 
! 
oepted as something that belon;s to a kind of rel~gio~8 faith. 
aeOrtega, Obras Completa.s, II; (Madrid. 1954), p. 723, and 
IV, 34~. 
2~ Ortega,Obras Completas, VI (_adrid, 1956), 9. 
30Ibid., II, 723. 
31ibid., II, 342. 
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According to Ortega, this division between ideas in general and 
sooial faith or sooial beliefs is more primordial than the div-
ision between religious faith and mow-ledge in general. Within 
the context of a general belief, a nation, an organization, and 
finally, an individUal will be forved to see some realities to 
which he is more inclined and to be blind to other realltiea. 
This is what Ortega calls the doctrll1e 2! ~ Eolnt .2.! view. 
The psychic structure of each individual results in a 
per8eptive organism, gifted with a determinate form 
that permits him to understand ::lene truths and blinds 
him with regards to' some other truths.32 
The function of this social point of view that beliefs creat 
is similar to the role of 'the myths and tal~s during childhood. 
In a study that Ortega wrote about the education of children, 
"fe.c~s provoke sentiments in .us •. What would happen not o1l1~" ~ 
child, but to a man', the most intelligent man in the world, if 
suddenly all theefficatious myths were taken away from his soul 
Things awaken in us a twofold re-action qf history and legend. 
\'Vhat rules our lives is not so much things, as wha t we intend to 
60 with them. .A.nd this goal of ours is an ideal, .ct legend in a 
way_ The sportman has only a realistic grasp of those realities 
32ortega, "Ideas y creenciaa," Ibid .. , V (Madrid, 1955), 384. 
;; .. tega, flBl 'QUljote t en 1&:' escuel .. ,,,,, IbId., II, (.adrid. 
1953), 296. 
9' 
that are not oonneoted with sports. "Myth, says Ortega, is the 
psychological hormone." ~ '}!Jhen we find someone who is not inter-
ested in anything and we try to injeot in him some new interests 
so that he can live again, we do not tell hi~ about things and 
facta--he probably knows as many things as we do--but about po.s. 
ible reactions and experienoes to which he is closed psychologioal 
lYe "What we are interested in, is that things be beautiful," 
says ortega. 35 And ~1 another place he says: "Life, before being 
I 
an ada,tAtion of man to his environment, i8 a reception of this 
environment by man, who needs in some way to feel it.n 36 This 
feeling depends on the perspective of an age. The belief system 
of a determinate cultural period is called by Ortega, the sensi-
bility of lite. Ortega calls it also the ~irit of the time. "At 
all moments, men live in a world of convictions, the greateat num-
ber of which are oonvictions co~~on to all peo~le who live in the 
same age. These conv1btlons constitute the spirit of the time.n '7 
"Any lite,n says Ortega, "willingly or unwillingl,., needs to just-
iry itself."38 Not only the individual must find an answer to the 
34I b1d •• p. 297. 
35Ibid., p. 289. 
36Ibid. 
37ortega, ItLa historia como sistema," Ibid., VI (MadrId,1956>. 
38 Ortega, "En tomo a Galileo," IbId., V (1955), 25. 
riddle of life, but also society. The spirit of the time is the 
answer to this riddle. It consists in 8 general attitude on the 
basis of whioh existence appoars in a determinate way. Things are 
perceived and interpreted according to their consistency with re-
gards to this spirit of the time. Social, political and economio 
problems are looked from the same viewpoint. 
Origin ~ Change or belief-systems: ifbat is the mechanism of 
the t~ansmission and alteration of these beliefs? The belief sy-
stem is nothing else than the general structure of all usages, 
their consistence and orgebization. However, when usages change, 
the systems of belie' can remain •. Sather it is modified progres-
sively, until the moment comes When the old structure 1s no longe 
compatible with the existing usages. 
Belief systems give us the sensibility of the epoch, 
and are not transmitted to us directly. Rather they 
are implicit in configurations of usages ~nich are 
, transmitted to un directly.39 
Dirference between beliefs and ideas: The main characteristic 
of belief-systems is their latent function. They are "everything 
that we take for granted, and that, as a result, we do not even 
think of .,,40 Beliefs a.re opposed to idea.s. Ideas are a1".,9oY8 
fabrica.ted in an explicit way_ They constitute scienoe, liber.-
39Ibid. 
4°Ortega. "Ideas y oreencias, Obr!s Completas, V (1955) ;87. 
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ture, and many other forme of O~a1 or written speeoh arbitrarlly 
used. Ideas only exist when we are thinking a bout them,· whereas 
beliets constltute our way of looking at 11fe. nTheox-ies on17 
exist when they are·thought." says ortega.41 From this he con-
cludes: "Therefore they exist, in a way, founded on our will. n42 
Ortega does not speak a\ any time about the validity ot ideas or 
bel,.r. Be is only interested in their psychological and social 
function. It is true that beliets otfer a great chanoe ot being 
talse, beoause of our unoritioal acoept~oe of them. SO tar as 
ideas are ooncerned, their truthfulness depends on their objeo-
tivity, which in turn, depends on the oonslateno}' ot one idea 
with all other ideas, and tin ally on the'oonsistenoy of this 
Whole scheme 'ot ideas with the beliet-system. 
Ideas require a critical attitude, just as the lungs 
need oxygen. They are susta1ned and reaftirmed in 
other ideas, which, on their turn, are sustained 10 
other ideas, constItuting a whole system. ao that the 
firmness of an idea is reduoed to the soll'1tr that 
, 
holds it and reters .it to all othera.n43 
42<>rtega, 
430rtega, "Ideas y creenias," Ibid., V (1955), ,89. 
9(; 
Man orientate. hi.selt through his age, througbt the socio-
cultural bellel.system. in whl.eh he finds himself. '!'t.1 s. and not 
any consideration about a soclal appetite. 1. what makes man soo-
ial and cultural at the same time. "AccordiD.il:.to Ortega, there 
are protound rea80Da that ellplaln the 800ia1 struoture ot human 
beings, these reaSODS are based on the fact tha.t a beliet cannot 
exist un~er the form ot belief of an individual or group," says 
Ferrater Mora.44 
The way in whioh beliets are borwn and develop 1.8 the same 
way in which culture and usages appear and ohange, 
Li'tle by 1itt18, scienoe, eithios, art. religious 
faiths, a juridioial norms get loose from the sub-
ject who oreated them and aquire a consistency and 
an authorIty by them.e1ves.45 
I!portance !! Ortegats SOoio10§l ~ Knowledge. Q!tega professes 
a striot determinism with regard to belie'., They are for htm 
the m.1n basil ot aocia1 life, and it is on aocount of them that 
one oan predict historioal and aoolal phenomena: 
The idea that all things influenoo one another and 
.~~ tha t ea41;J.. .. thlng depend. on eve17thlng el.e i8' " ' 
va ..... W.tioal thought whioh is repugn8.1lt to anyone 
who likes to aee things •• they are. No. the bo~ 
ot h1storical tacts possess6s a consistency and ~ 
del' pertectly b1er.u~ohlcal. ThU8 the mere transfor-
44F3rr~ter Mora, La tilolOtla de Ortega T Ga •• et (Buenos Ai.e 
1958). Ih 78. ' 
45ortega, Obras C~leta8, III -(1954), 146. 
matioD of an industJ"ial or political order is hard-
17 profound, and depends on ideas and moral and e.t-
hetical preterences that mirror the contemporary 
scene. But Ideology, taste, and moralIty are nothIng 
more than t~Lspeclfic result of the radical sensibil-
ity of life.4o ' 
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Ideas as artiticial bell.t.: The basic ditrer~tno. between belief • 
.............. ;;. - " 
and idea. is explol'8d: About bellers I "it 1s possible to say 
that they are not ideas W~ have, but i~eas we a~. More than that 
precisely because they are most radical beliet., they are identl-
tied with reality itselt ••• they 10 •• , therefore, their cbaraoter 
ot ideas, of thoughts ot someone. "47 Ideas on the oontrarf, 
"al'e our own products, and ,therefo", they presuppose our exist. 
ence which is grounded on beliefs.1148 Ortega oontinues: ttWhat 
we cannot do is to live by them,"49 namely, in the same way 1n 
which we live by a beliet. sinoe ideas are irrelevant to our 11t. 
the prooess by Which we create them, namsly thinking, is a supra-
activity, a sort .f !port. This is the basio differenoe between 
thinking and believing. ~~ build ideas, says Ortega, preoise17 
because we do not believe in them. Beliefs are intimately oon-
neoted wi th llf. J ideas with adventure. sport, ete.. And this 1s 
a speoial case of the general theory about the function ot the 
intelleot in li.fe. 
470rtega, "Ideas '1 creenolas," Obraa Comp1etaa, (Madrid, 1956t 
p. 3aibld. 
4.9Ibld. 
The intellectual life is secondary with respect to 
our real autb.enjjlc life, and represents only I. vir-
tual or imaginery dimeusion of our lives.50 
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This way of speaking or Ortega--so it seems--is opposed to 
every modern interpretation of science, especially of the social 
scienoes. We OJ not practice sociology for the sport of it. Much 
less do we engage in practical social activities for pure fun. 
Since the tirne of Comte, sociologists are believed to have an im-
poetant role in our age of change and confusion. From the know-
ledge of the moral sciences, man today expects to resolve his 
problema and prepare a better world for the future. tmat is the 
answer of Ortega to those objeotions? 
Social function of ideologies: science~ literature,~. Scienoe. 
he would say, explains everything except what makes us believe in 
it. In the last instance, we will see that what makes us do 80 1. 
not put into question because it is something that usuallybeltng. 
to the general feelings of our generation. In the Middle Age., 
religious faith was believed to be the great weapon to solve soo-
ial and pol! tioal problems, Tha. t if! 'N hy science was enolosed wi tb 
in the walls of the monasteries and had no influence on public 
life. Today we expect everything from acience. This dose! 2! 
rea so:n , Ortega points out, began with socrates and reached its 
cl1max :wi th DEmartes," Among the bali.,. that present men have. 
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the bellet in 'reason' 1s still one of the ~ost impobtant.w51 
The taot that impresses Ortega, Is that sclence, 11ke philosoph7. 
does not justify it. foundatlon, whatbrlngs us to phllosophiz. 
or to scientific research? 
Sclence cannot only be a science of society, but it 
pretends to be also a. Boience of man. Now what has 
seienoe or reason to say with precision about this 
tact so urgent and so pertinent to it, namely, its 
value and importance. Well, nothing. Science does 
not know anything clear about this point.52 
-Orteg~ y Gasset is talking here about the natural sclenoes. 
Oan we apply the same ideas to the social sciences? Ortega say. 
that the social sciences are intimately connected with the natur-
a1."ln Comte as well as In stuart Mill, everything depends on the 
Immut"bliity of the laws of nature.u53 That Ortega aooepts1hls 
positIon of Comte and Mill. is easy to deduce from paragraphs lIke 
the following, where he treats common opinion: "For we are not. 
dealing with an opinion based on faots more of les8 frequent and 
probable, but on a law of :lol}i.al tphysiCs' muohmore immovable 
than the l"ws of Newton' s physics." 51.... The dogma of reason is 
;lIbid., p. '90. 
;2ortegat Obras Completas, v~ (1956), 21. 
5'Ibid ... p.29 
54 Ortega, The Revolt £! ~ Masses l p. 127. 
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neve~ analyze in detail by Ortega. He gives it as a ract. So 
the very logioal nature and objeotivity of thought, seems to be 
made de?endent on sooio-oultural tactors: 
It has been held, that thinking is principally log-
ical thinking, in othe~ words,thinklng according to 
determinate laws that logicians have oalled tprin-
ciples.' But 10g1cal think1ng--as we have,":sa1d.-ia 
only one of the multiple forms of thought and a ver,r 
restricted one. It the limitations of loCtOAl thought 
have not been dleoovered before, it is because philoso-
phers have had an unlimited trust in a unilateral type 
of logioal thinking.55 
And this trust .. we may add, 1s a belief acoording to Ortega. 
Belief chanS! ~ sooial inestabiittl The second step in the e~ 
planation of beliefs and ideas, is th&ir formation and ohange into 
one another. This section of Ortega's sociolog7 of knowledge cor-
responds in a way to the modern oategories of oultural change and 
cultural lag. Beltets certainly change. Today, Ortega writes, 
the Europeans have lost thei:- faith in science and they start 
doubting the role 01' l'eason in lite.56 The moment when man or 
society asks about the validity of a social belief, 1s the moment 
ot doubt." In the elementary g~ound of our beliets, enormous gaps 
of doubt open up here and there.1t57 Ortega continues: "One doul1B 
550r tega, "Ideas y oreen1as," Obras Completas (Madrid,1955), 
p. 406. 
56Ferrater Mora, L~ f11080f1& ~ Orts!! Z Gaa8et p. 85. 
;7or tega, ftldeas 7 creenias," ?braa Compl~taa, V (Madrid, 
1955), ;88. 
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beoause one is plaoed between two oontradiotory beliefs that bump 
into eaoh other, pulling aside the ground on which we rest."58 
Notioe the great differenoe that exists between this doubt as 
desoribed by Ortega, and the doubt. that oome up when we are 
manipulating ideas. Whil. on the intelleotual level the doubt 
does not affeot us; in the area of beliefs, the same doubt lea.es 
us in the air and robs our lives of something that has to be re-
paired. The ultimate re~son for the importanoe of doubts in this 
area is that we believe in them. Or rather we 'believe in the two 
antagont.tic beliefs that the doubt tries to reoonoile. 
Do not take this as a pure paradox, but I oonsider very dift-
j.ct!lt to e xpre ss what a real doubt i,8 wi. thout sa.ying that 
we believe in it. I~ that were not so, if we doubted a-
bout our doubt, it would not be a doubt at all. 59 
Our whole lite seems to crumble because beliefs are the gen-
eral possibilities of courses of action, of vital expansion. The 
doubt, like the belief, can begin in the individual, but it doe. 
not oonstitute a menaoe until it is incorporated into sotiety. A 
period of 10*1a1 doubt 1. a peridd ot change of culture and per-
speotive of l~f'i. How does the individual or socl~t7 react in 
such a case? Man devotes himself to thinking. And such thinking 
58Ibid., p. 392. 
au 
59Ibid., p. 394. 
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is no longer a sport, but an aotivity which oonstitutes a matter 
of lite or death. Finally, man constructs an idea, an artifioal 
beliet, and sooiety progressively forgets about the way this i-
dea was attained and about its logioal basis. The artificial be-
lief or idea is transformed into a social dogma. 
Then we have no other way out but building a new idea 
or opinion about things, t he things we are loubttng a-
bout. Ideas are, in this case, the objects we consoi. 
ously build and elaborate precisely becau3e we do not 
believe in them. 60 From this thinking, man return. to 
the reality that has been stolen from h~. and now he 
has recuperated. 
From his ensimismamlento man oomes ba.k to realit,. to the 
reality that he sees now as through an optlQl devioe, with his 
interior world of ideas, some of which are transformed and con-
solidated in beliefs.6l 
Not all the ideas are trlllsformed into beliefs. In order 
tor an idea to become beliet, it has to be revealed--this is the 
Ortegian expression--to society. The idea beoomes a ne. faith 
that i. aocepted without argument. 
There is revelation whenever man come. into oontact 
60Ibid., p. '9'. 
-
6lIb1d ., p. '91. 
-
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with a nww reality different from him, and it does not 
make too much difference what type of reality illi sis, 
if it appears to us as sheer reality and not as a cav-' 
illion or imagination of ours. 62 
D1ffer~nce between usages ~ beliefs: Up to this point we have 
establiShed a perfect parallel between usages and beliets. How-
ever, beliefs, as we stressed at the beginning of this chapter. 
are implicit in the ue.ges. Usages and beliefs originst~ in the 
same way, but not every usage implies a new beliet. UBat~es are 
manifestations of beliefs, ~nd can be at times lrreconciable 
with them. The change o~ beliefs always constitutes a change of 
cultube and weltansohauung. 
"The individual," says Ortega, ttCaD only orientate himselt 
in the universe through his raoe. For he is immersed in it like 
a drop of water in III wondering oloud."63 Ortega tend. to dis-
cover the historical epo8bs not so much in their factuality, as 
in their meaning. To grasp the latter, one must look at the 
facts in their historical perspective or style of life. "We 
tend to forget," Orte[<a says, "that each race is an experience 
of a definite type of life, of a new sensibility.,,64 History 
62rbid •. 1 p. 4.01. 
630rtega, Obras COmpletas, VI (Madrid, 1956), 44. 
64Ibid., p. 61. 
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beoomes in the hands of Ortega the verifioatioh of his theory 
of beliefs and ideas. As men evolve, their historioal set changes 
and as a consequenoe he changes too. "When the living being e-
volves, his environment and especially the perspective of things 
around him, change with htm.n65 
Historicism ~ ortega: Ortega has many different essays about 
almost any period of European history. Some of his general oon-
olusions have already been explained, like'his soo1010gy of war 
deduced from the idea of the knight and from dIfferent historioal 
dootrines like paoifism, direot action, eto.. Time does not allow 
us to study in detail all these essays of Ortega. 
We do not pretend to consider these studies as a mere socio-
logical to:.'! •• AD ... matter of fact, ortega oonsidered histCll"7 as 
a metaphysioal explanation during a great period of his life. 
Furthermore, bis dialogue with Momsen, Spengler. and other great 
historians, place him in the field of histo~ itself. At this 
point of our work we only want to enumerate the baois original 
ideas more clOsely connected with the sooiology of knowledge, 
One of these questions is the following: "Without any doubt, 
the great~st questiOI:kt.o.:'be asked by historians today aOlmds like 
~)ortesa, Obras COmp1etas, I (Madrid, 1953), 362. 
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this: Vfuo is the real subject of history?n66 A few pages later 
Ortega gives the a.nswer: ttThe real historical subject a.re cul-
tures not races or people.1167 Ortega's answer to the :same ques-
tion had been, a few years earlier, different. He considered the 
generations as the real subjects of history. However, when he 
defines it, there seems to be no boticeable difference between 
generation and c~lture. 
Co~~union in time and in spaoe are the main cha»acter-
istios of Ii generation. The.s two things together mean 
the communion in a general destiny.68 
A generalion not a group of illustrious men, nor simply 
a mob. It is like 8. new socIal body completed with its 
selected minority and its multitude which has been sent 
into eXistence. 69 
The connection of all this discussion about the subject of 
history with sociology can be seen from the next paragra.ph: "Each 
genera.tion represents a vital attitude from which existenoe is 
felt in a particular way."70 
66Ibid., III (1954), 192. 
67 Ortega, Obras Completa.s, III (Madrid, 1954.), p. 298. 
68Ibid· e 
69ibid., V, (1955) p. 39, III, p. 147. 
70Ib~.d., 148 • 
... -
106 
In other words. the imyortnnt factor in deterulining what a 
generation is. is the social dogma. But this corresponds. says 
Ortega, with the communion in space-time. The secondpoint to be 
noticed is the aristooratic conception of society that has with 
its minority-majority relation determines the creation and evol-
ution of the weltansohauung or perspective of life. The very his-
torioal changes are ohanges ln belief-systems, according to this 
theory. Hlstory, for Ortega, ohanges not beoause the facts are 
different, but beoause the interpretation that men give to the 
same or different facts evolves. Ortega dlffers fram the histori-
cal theories of Spengler mld Froenius about the importanoe of the 
generation for he looks at the generation as an open system that 
evolves aocording to the laws of change of social beliefs. The 
culture, he says, not the peoples, make history.7l And ln another 
place he says: 
When the modifioation that the world Buffers does not 
affect what I believe to be its main constitutive ele-
ments, the general profile of this world remalns intaot. 
Man does not have the impression that the world haa ,_ 
changed, but only that something has changed ln the 
world. 72 
7lortega, Obras Completas, Ibld., (Madrld, 1954) 300. 
72Ibld., V (1955), 35. 
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The important factor about this generation is that they 
ahould not be considered as suoceeding one another- (costaneaa) 
but as living together in the same historical scenery (conte~ 
Formeaa). The today. Ortega oontinue., signifies th1'ee differ-
ent things, one to the young people, another to the adults and 
another to the old people. Who preoisely, aska Ortega, i8 the 
real subject of h:i.storioal change? 
Children and old people hardly play a signifioant role 
in history, the former by defect, the latter by excess. 
lut men in their first years of youth do not have any 
positive contribution in history whether, for the his-
torical role of this age is passive: it consists in 
learning in the sohools and military servioe. 73 
Ortega descends to suoh details that he appears at timea in-
fluenced by the common way of t~inking of the first sooiolgista 
as expressed in the three stages of Comte, or the Darwinian peri-
0 •• of spencer. History, he says, is carried out by people be-
tween the ages of ~O and 60 ye~P8. So far as the historical cy-
oles of a culture, its birth and death oan be determined once we 
know the ages of the subjeots of history. Ortega ends up in with 
almost mathematical way of determining oultural ohanges, and he 
trie. to verity his methodology by plaoing people like Descartes, 
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Galileo, and many others at the top of cultural changes. The 
cultural shifts take place every fift.en years more or les •• 
These cultural shifts result in rztbmea or historical Tie.s. 
Ortega analyzes these rythmes with regards to the outlook of 
dirferent periods abo~t s.x, age, buying, and things of this 
kind. Some of these studies, like -Le. escaparates mandan, "or 
"Mascu~ino 0 femenino" offer very little subject-matter for the 
soci.logist and anthropologist and place him more in the realm 
of literature than science. To a great degree, these studies 
ofter a similarity with Spencer's cultural descriptions and ob-
servations. 
748ee La rebelion de las mas •• (Madrid, 1958), pp. 189-193, 
200 ... 208. - - -
CHAPTER V 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF ~ OF ORTEGA 
The soope and orientation of this tentative field of socio-
logy is desoribed in these words by Barnett: 
In some respeots this field oan best be desoribed 
as as a point of view or attitude toward art, rather 
than as a reoognized area of study encompassing a 
speoific subject matter, employing aooepted methods 
of investigation, and seoure in its possession of an 
establishes frame of referenoe. On the whole, the 
sooiologist who stUdies art is not yet olearly diff~ 
erentiated, in term. of soholarly funotion, fram the 
social historian, the art historian, or the art orit-
io.l 
The sooiology of art, like the ,sociology of knowledge, is a 
modification of the general history of ideas-win our o~se history 
of art--inasmuoh as it uses a soientifio methodology and restriots 
its interest to art as influenoed by socio-cultural phenomena. 
The seneral thee's of the sooiology of art is that art refleots 
the nature of oultural interaotion, cultural ohange, and social 
norms of sooiety. The 80Qiologioal approach to art is almost as 
old as art itself, but has taken ,on a new dimension in the works 
of Hegel and Colingwood. Hegel's volgheist or spiritual prinoip-
IJames H. Barnett, "The 80cio1037 of Art," Sociology Today 
(New York. 1959). p. 198. 
""l •. .~ 
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le of Ii culture reflected in its art forms, has also been dis-
cussed by men like Comte, Spencer, Toynbee. These dissussions 
were scientific theories and not mere common sense considerationsl 
however, they are still very far from the goal of scientifio veri-
fication. ~ith the philosophical ground provided by men like 
Hegel, Dilthey, Marx, and with the methodological tools of Weber, 
Durkheim, ana others, who studied art as part of the sociology of 
religion and eulture, the sociology of art can today stand on its 
own feet as an independent field. Currently the field of symbol-
ic expression and art have been treated extensively by some writ-
ers: Cassirer, Langer, Levy-Bruhl, and sociologists like Simmel 
and 1!'ach. 2 Cultural anthropologists have also done a great deal 
of research in this area. Malinowski, for instance, considered 
myth as a revelation of the sooia1 character within his funotion-
al approach. Mead has applied some of the basic insights of 
Freud to symboli0 forms.' The general contribution of these 
writers about symbolism to sooiology can be best summari,ed in 
these words of Albrsoht: "Toynbee finds that art styles more ac-
2augh Duncan, "Sociology of Art, Literature and MUsio: Sool ... 
a1 Contexts of symbolic Experience," in Modem Sociological The-
ory, ed. by Becker and Bosko!! (New York, 1951), p. 482. 
'''For Mead, the social was a category in its own right, to 
be explained by the socIal aspects of the role-taking in communi-
cation, rather than by analogy to physical nature, bio1ogioal en-
vircnment, or the sUbstantation of Spirit, Goc, or Society." IbId 
p. 483. 
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curately establlab~ , the sp"n of a 01vl11aatlon, it s growth and 
dissolution, than any other method of measurement.n4 
Literature reflects the socio-cultural milieu and exeroises 
R great influence and social control over the social attitudes 
and behavior. Studies 1n this area" tend to treat art as a pro-
duct as well ,"S a determinant of socla.l structU!te. Other socio-
logists tend to emphasize more empirically relev~t aspeota, suoh 
as the inst i tutionalization of art in different sooieties. They 
otter a general theory tor suoh researoh areas as the influenoe 
I 
of group-affiliation and artistio oreativity, the, sooial status 
and role of the artists, public and oritio, and their mutual in-
teraotion.5 But the 800iologioal approaoh to art whioh is more 
relevant for our treatment of Ortega is that founded on the sooio-
logy of knowledge. Marx waa also the first Who treated art as a 
mirror of the economio struoture of SOCiety, Of cou»se, here, as 
before, we must stress the philosophioal commitment of Marx with-
out whieh his sociologioal vie. are nothing but indioations tor 
future research. "Marx argued that even art preferenoes dll'.ter 
acoording to class position and outlook.n 6 
,4Albrecht, Milton" "The Relationship of Literature and Sooi. 
ety," !!.:.l.. 2!.. soo., VI, (1959), 427. 
5Bamett, nThe Sooiology of Art,1t p. 408. 
6Ib1d., p. 200. 
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For Sorokin, art is one of the dependent vari~b1es of the 
three systems of truth. 7 Mannheimt. oentra1 thesis, namely, that 
"there are modes of thought whioh oannot be adequately understood 
as long as their sooia1 origins are ebscured," is espeoia11y re-
levant to the social study of art. Art is a type of knowledge 
closer to the qualitative than to the exact sciences, according 
to Mannhetm. The relation of the latter to social groups and 
epoohs is somewhat obscure in Mannheim, but the relation of the 
former to the same groups is more definite. And among the exam-
ples Mannheim has given of the qualitative SCiences, many refer 
to art. 
Just as in art we oan date particular forms on ground 
of their definite association with a particular period 
of history so in ~; case of knowledge we can detect 
with increasing exaotness the perspeotive due to a part-
icular historioal setting.8 
And in another chapter he say81 
This prooess of the oomplete destruction of all spirit-
ual elements, the utopian as well as the ideological, has 
its parallel in the most resent trends of modern life, 
7Ibld., p. 205. 
8Mannheim, Ideology ~ Utopia, p.271. 
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and in their corresponding tendencies in the realm 
of art.') 
still there is a reluctance in Marmheim, to treat a.rt a.s Ill. 
defini to type of' human knowledge, like science. Thi S pI'oblem doe 
not exist for Ortega, who identified the. sociological origin of 
art with that of scienoe. 
As in the case of ti:'.i.e general sociology of knowlledge, we can-
rlot avoid preliminary considerations about thought-interpretation 
so here we must engage in interpretations of art wl1ich are beyond 
the Bcope of the sociologist. Not only the general nature 01" art 
i'oni'ls must be studied and defined, but particular interpretation. 
are to be manipulated in order to relate them in an adequate man-
ner to the general weltanschauung of a cultural age. lO 
The central work of the sociology of' art in Oriaga is constt-
tutad by his essay: 'rhe Dehumanization of Art and at few remarks 
--- ---------------
of his Ideas and Bellefs. Ortega approves full heartedly the 
possibility of a sociological apPI'oach to art. 1\ Among the mul-
tiple ideas of the French genius Guyau, his attempt to study art 
9 Ibtd._ p. 256. 
lOAlbrecht, pp. 426-27. 
lJl~ 
from a sociologica.l point of view must be considered.nll As a 
matter of fact, Ortega. confes,ses that this is the only genial idea 
of Guyau since of his sociologic6Il interpretation of art: "only 
the title exists; the rest of the work has yet to be ':rritten."l2 
For the Spanish SOCiologist, art, together with science, 1s the 
w,ain manifesta.tion of the change of the sensibility of an epoch. 
The reason is that art ru}d science constitute this realm of hu-
man activity which is more independent of sooial taboos and nor.ms. 
That is why when a oultural ohange starts developing, its blue-
print oan be found in art and science. Art appreoiation and art 
response becomes, in this context, a typical oase of what we de-
scribe before as exemplarity. The artists are sooial leaders. 
Art is not only a by-product of imagination in general, but of a 
definite type of imagination: that by whioh men plan their lives 
and control their social and po1itica1 environmaat. Art 1s the 
first message of this change of attitude and choioe-patterns of 
a culture. According to Ortega, the way in which art has to be 
approached by the SOCiologist is not wi~h an undetaohed analytica 
attitude but by a sympathetic observation. Of all the ~roduot. 
of human knowledge, art is the one that requires more preparation 
on the side of the scientist. This general methodological ques-
llortega, n La de shumanizaoion del arte, n Obrae Compl etas, III 
(Madrid, 1955), 353. 
12Ib1 •• 
-
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tion creates many difficulties. To what degree is it possible 
to have objective outlook to empirical researoh when art-inter-
pretation is a conditio ~ qua !!2!!. of posterior .ooiological 
considerations? "Why", Ortega asks, tlis the point of view of the 
indifferent and not of the lover corisidered as decisive?"13 Ex-
&mining the case of the man who falls in love, he oontinues: 
It I will only say that, according to my judgment. i.we analyze 
the phenomenon of this sublime feeling of love, it w1ll be found 
very soon that love oannot see beoause it. function 1. not to 
seo ••• The normaa fact i. that the l~ver of an objeot or of a be-
ing has a more exaot vision than the indif.ferent.n14 Art is a 
manifestation 01 the vital attitude or a oulture, of its over-all 
reaotion to the historical surroundings. If interpretation of 
oulture require a minimum of partioipant behavior, how:much more 
will it be neoessarr to have partioipant behavior wben the ques-
tion is a bout the implioit synthesis of a social epoch. "only 
men oan experience what is human," says Ortega paraphrasing 
Goethe.15 Man always aots in an artistic way. He defends himself 
from the weather with dresses and houses, etc., which never ful-
fl11 a mere material function. On the contrary, they beoome ob-
jects of artistic and symbolic expression. In a more gene~al way 
130rtega, Obras Completas, III (Madrid, 1955),292. 
14Ibid. 
15Ibld, 
we can S'8.y that it is impossible to understand any hUlnan action 
materially oonsidered. 'l,e must refer it to the context where it 
1s direoted. To live is as muoh an ir.dividuat1 problem as a soo-
1al one, and all at.~ltudellJ and behavior of men reflect their soo-
ial environment which is .full of artistio behavior. 
Every human gesture, is a gesture of mastery or of 
slavery. Tertim non datur. 
----
This is the reason why 
everyone decides this or that style an attitude in 
life. The servile gesture is servile because the man 
who performs it does not exist founded on himself, 
and lives, at all moments, by oomparing himself to 
other people.16 
"Every generation," says Ortega, "Has .. definite vital atti-
tude.,,17 Ortega divides the ages into ma.souline and feminine, ao-
oording to the prevalence role given to one or other sex; into 
young and old; into times of plenitude and poverty, and so on. 
These different attitudes are usually discovered in art. The 
present attitude of the revolt of the masses is ~isoovered in the 
--...... _----
so-oalled phenomenon of the dehuaanlzation of art. Following 
very olosely this essay we can observe how the SOCiology of art 
is manipulated in the hands of Ortega. 
16ortega, 1!. rebelion de las masas, p. 193. 
17ortaga, Obras Completas! III p. 148. 
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A striking sociologioal •• peot ot modern art, Ortega writes, 
i. its unpopulariq. Modern art is not only oultivated but ap-
i, f 
preolated by an elite which does not exeroi.e any inf1uenoe upon 
the masses. Any new .rtistie tendenoy, It 18 true, is unpopular 
for a short period, until it 18 finally inoorporated into the rea 
of the masses. But today's unpopularity in art i. much more radi-
oal. 
The disjunctive i. produoed in a deeper level than that 
in which the varieties of individual taste funotion ••• 
To my judgment the charaoteristic note of modern art 
tram a sociological viewpoint, i. that it divide. the 
publio into two olasses of people, tho.e who understand 
1 t and thosa who do not.1S 
There is a marked eftort on the side of the artist to make 
art for its own sake. above, or, we could even aay, againat. the 
response of the publio. This 8ooiolo.&cal~ taot is partioularly 
surprising--Ortega notioes--in an age when the masses have come to 
the fore of history. Nothing is more opposed to the. equality of 
all men as modern art, .aY8 ortega.19 The nineteenth century is 
the age of great massive movements. :The crowd invades all the im-
portant place. and determines all oodes ot behavior. The art be. 
lSortega, "La deshumaninzaoion del arte," p. 355. 
19Ibid., p.356. 
M 
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oomes popular as never before. Romantici8m is the popular art par 
excellenoe. Its tendenoy to imitate nature and its themes of love I 
suffering, hatred snd envy, etd., have a great appeal for all kindl 
of publio. Romantioism is sn instr1.lm.ental art, and all its values 
are taken from the objeots it s~Olize •• , 
During the 19th century the artists .. va prooeeded too 
oarelessly. They reduoed to a minimum the artistio ele-
ment.and made their art eons~st almost exclusively in a 
fiotion about human realitie •• 20 
The sorrowful fate of Tristan and Isolde only influences 
those who donsider it a reality, or as a symbol of many po •• lble 
similar stories. In other words, the artists aim at a pure !mita-
tion and the artistio forms tend to di sappear and leave the audI-
ence 1n contaot with reality. 
Today there is an opposite tendency and art is sought after 
for it s own .aka. There is a compelling need to arrive at the 
pure artistio form. \Vhether this is po.sible or not, is another 
question. ttThe new art," says Ortega, "is an artistio art. tt2l 
Ortega t s examples are taken from painting, musio and lIterature. 
Through them he arrives at the following generalizationl "Eaoh 
atyle that appears through history, oan engender a oertain number 
of different fDrms within a generic type. But the day comes when 
20Ibid., p. 358. 
21IbIdl, p. 359. 
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the magnifioent source of forms is exhauated.n22 
Modern art opens the door to infinite ne. possibilltes, be-
cause It 1. not an imitative art. The forms of Imitation are, 
therefore, as numerous as mants imagination. Thi. artlatlo ex-
peasion of modern art, instead of being a pure crTstal, l"-1re in 
t 
Raaantloi8B. becomes the only point ot intere.t. The sign repla_ 
completely the signlfled objeot. This is what Ortega means by art 
tor its own sake. And the avoidance and positive deformation of 
reality constltutes the dehumanization ot art. The Romantic art ----~------~-----ls ea87 to evaluate because It is ea.,. to partioipate in Its crea-
tiODS. It is an art that portrays the common experlence. ot lite, 
In Whlch .e all are experts. Modern art, an the contrarr. retu.e. 
this attltude totally and demans trom the audience an undetachet 
spirit ot contemplation rather than'participatlon. Ortega eata-
blishe. a .oale of art-appreciation: 
In one extreme we tla. an aspect of the world, periODS 
and things that constitutes the experienced realitr. Ir1 
the other we see everrthing under the aspect of cont •• -
plated reallt,,23 
The dehumanization ot modern art cODslsts in the artlst.s in-
22Ibld., p. 360. 
23xbld., p. 362. 
I 
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teMst in the id.a in it.el1", not in the objeot. Bowlt i. on 
thielevel ot the Idea for it. own sake, where any vital and ex-
perienti .. l reaotion is suppr •••• d. So thati the art doe. not be. 
f 
oome inhuman becau.e it represents inhuman elementa, but mainly 
b.cause ita goal i. to dehumanize. The important element there. 
fore is not the terminus a guo, but the terminus ~ quem, saye 
Orte.. The fact of today' a opposition to ROlUUltloia i8 nothing 
surprising from. a meta-historioal viewpoint. atlti$ymns of his-
tOl'J ~ aocording to Ortega, proceed by oP!"'ol,1 tic)Q. '!'l'~I::'~~ i!ll &lOll 
ani«ll.Ul period ,of discov.1'7 and 1" •• years later, the8aturat. 
':--.1£ p(.\~.;"t., "1Ib&~ th~ passlbill tie. of a typ. Cl1". art are exhausted. 
Then people invent something different, somethiug which i. uaually 
oppos.d to the old type of ar,t. Howev.r, the signifioant and pe-
culiar aspeot of today's art, aocording to Ortega, ls that it is 
going agaInst the past in general, so that the result il not an 
attack on a definite type of art, but an art in general. "Because 
at the .nd, to attaok the art is to rebel against art itselt, for 
.hat other thing is art it not what bas been done 1n the past,ft24 
Art, acoording to ortega, Is ~bolic by nature, and a pure ob-
jectlve or oontemplatlve attitude 1n art 1s impossible. But the 
mistake is to oonfuse a mere obj~otlvistio with an undetaohed at-
titud. of oontemplation. There is laok of objectivity whenever 
we reaot diaproportionately to same stimulus. Tbe mau who wine 
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a g .. at prize reaots disproportionately llfc .. does not teel any-
thing, or 11 he teels too muoh. so, ortega oonclude., "Under the 
mask of a love tor art in its purity there hid •• " • contempt aDd 
hatred tor art.~25 And this oontempt is a mirror of a sooiologl-
cal attitude, "Hatred for art cannot- exiat without generatlng a 
parallel hatre~ to.r the ",hole OU1,ural reality ot an age."2.6 This. 
hatred tor OU1*Ml is the the retalt ot the .a8.e. agalf,18t all 
Qul tural norm •• 
Art together wi t-h soienoes belong to the ".-.1':11 ()~~ ~~e ,ooio-
logy of knowledge that Ortega called idea,. However a~ our ideas 
? 
are., as we said betore, grounded on some belieta. Si~ce':rt and 
'cience are also as we aaid before, more independent trom tabooa 
than any other type ot inowledge, they are a atrong indication of 
the new ohange in the sen.ibili t7 ot lite J ot the ne .. type ot be-
liet system. Art; espeCiallY', has a strong 1nd1vidualist1c a.pec\ 
and aa such, reve.ls to us the ne .. type ot beliet-qate .. s that sub-
sti tute tor and take the pla ce ot the old aoc1al dogma. Ortega, 
in the torms ot modern art, envisage •• future time .. hen all norma 
and oultural value. will be d1sm1saed by the mas.e., it soc1ety 
doe. not d1scover again a "powerful minority" that lea4s 1t to 
some definite "''"7 :o:~ 1. ,:.. ( 
27artega,L& rebellon de las m&.&s, p. 180. ' 
- ----
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Art, li~e any idea, is the product of a super-activity, or 
sport, Ortega would say, vbat we do in tnis area of ideas is ir-
relevant to our lite. Ha.wer, Ideas, in the long run, consolidate 
into crede. and they become artificial beliefs, as we sald before. 
The sociolo*loal conolusion then, is that an art for its ewn sake 
Is never going to be transformed Into belief, sinoe art for Its 
own sake is like an idea that is never gOing to be anything but 
an idea. 
Wanting to have an a rt that has no inrluenoe in society Is 
going against the nature of art itself. All ideas are based on 
beliers. An art Which is not based in any belief is something to 
whioh we do not give any importanoe. The oonslusion is that mod-
ern art, more than being popular is antipopular. rebel. against 
any type 0' sooial dogma on Which it oould be founded. It 1. not 
the mere tact that the masses do not l1ke or understand It, but 
tbe tact is 1tha~ artists today want to avold tWe me..ssea with tbet 
aame interest with which they avold tbe forms ot nature, Or_ega 
says. This rebelion against the foundations of art Makes art oom-
pletely ludicroup and irrelevant. "For the man of our new gener-
ation art is 8. thing without any transoendence.u28 Tbe artist has 
renounced to his soclal responsibility. Be doe. not ~~nt the ap-
proval of the masse.; he hates to be understood by them because he 
does not want art converted In something Importaftt from a socio-
logical viewpOint. Art 18 sool010ilcal1y irrelevant for the first 
28 
l2~ 
time in history. It does not contribute to any change or atti-
tudes and belieta, as it always did. On the other hand, .e may 
reverse the former statement, saying that art mirrors the general 
attitude of puer1lity of our age, thus beooming so010log1cal17 
mean1ng.ful. 
The young art is not so much ditrernet1cated trom 
the old regarding its objects, but rather relarding 
,he jubjectlve attitude of the art1st towards art ••• 
This is the situation in whIch Europe fInds Itself today. 
The system of values that was controll1ng Europe thirty 
year. ago, bas lost its toroe ot attraction and vigour. 
The western man lacks a radical orientation beoause he 
does not know to which star turn.29 
.Art haa introduoed us, once more, to the general theme ot 
Ortega, the revolt of t he masses against all values and oulture, 
and the oODsequent disorientation ot human k1nd. 
29artega, Obras 0Gmfletas, III 194 and 19~. 
OHAPTEB YI 
OOllOLUSIOII 
Up to this point our only conoern has been to present an ao-
count ot the sooiology ot Ortega y Ga.set. This 1s wh~, except 
tor a re. remarks directed to clarity a tew obscure points, .e 
have intentionally av01ded any personal evaluation and cr1ticis 
ot the 80c1010gy we have abstracted and syatematized, so that we 
can put Ortega in h1s place 1n the tield ot the sooial aciences. 
our work has been amb1tlous and, to a great extent, can ~d anould 
be expanded. we could have limited ourselves to the development 
ot a tew socl010gloal questions ot ortega. However, IUch an at-
tempt would have been ot little help tor those who did not bave an 
introduotorJ knowledge of Ortega's general sooiology. In the ab-
sence ot suoh introductorr work we have telt justitied to wrlte 
this thesis a. an introduotion to furtherstudles. And .. hope 
that our work did not olose the door tor those~o. looking more 
tor truth than tor llterary expressions, 'can r1d themselves in or-
der to accept whatever is valuable trom his sociolog1cal wr1ting •• 
Now we want to complete that which has been 80 tar a text book or 
Ortega-, soc101087, with a personal 1mpre.s10n which Should resped 
the synthetl0 torm ot our whole prev10ua .-position. 
The bulk or the sooiolog1 ot Ortega 1 Ga.aet waa written be. 
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tween 1910 and 1930 when sociology was still a new science. Ex-
cept for his historical knowledge, Ortega did not bring many 
methodological improvements into the field of the social sciences4 
However, in the level of theory, his contribution was considera-
tion. The vari*tr of themes and the consistence ot exposition, 
prescinding from validity and verification, which we will criti-
cize in a moment, place Ortega's sociology very close to the soc-
ial work of his contemporary writers. The general sociology ot 
Ortega'. contained in !!E ~ pe2Ple is a long and solid treat-
ment which should be included in any text book of 80ciologi.oal 
theorf and history of sociological thought. It is true that his 
studies about the sociology of war, law, and scienoe are very 
sketchy. Yet his social study of political phenomena and ot the 
social function and origin of myth and ideology (ldeas 1 creencia ~ 
cannot be disregarded. 
In the present work we have male a general value-judgment 
about Ortegats contribution to the different branches of socio-
logy by the importance and length we have given to these differ-
ent branches. We have hesitated about wtiting a separate section 
with Ortega's sociology of waP and science, but these two fields 
can hardly be considered as Indopendent from the SOCiology ot 
knowledge of which they are sketohy ramifications. Nevertheless, 
we have written a chapter about Ortega's sooiology of art, for 
his social treatment of the latter, though dependent on his gen-
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era1 sooiology of knowledge and politioa1 sociology, presents 
enough material for those interested in the field. 
From another viewpoint the disposition of the subject-matter 
of the thesis oan be considered arbitrarl. Here we have in mtnd 
the great logioal oonneotioq4nd developmettt of Ortega's sooiolog-
ical writings ~&h we have had to reorgan~e around somewhat 
arbitra~ ohapters for purpose of oharity. It is true that Orteg 
never did picture himself as a political sociologist of knowledge 
The tact of the matter is that O~tega wrote political sociology, 
sociology of knowledge, etc. Finalll. we have failed in present-
ing with oomplete faithfulness the logical network o:fOrtega f $.; '.l 
sociological ideas beoause we have preferred organization rather 
than argumentation and synthetio oorrelations. Ortega's wo~k t,. 
to be oonsidered like the pieces ot a maohine whioh oannot, stri~ -
ly speaking, be put together gradatim, but rather·all at once. 
The general s ooiologr of our author is the main doctrinal 
body to whioh all other social writin&K should be referred. 
Ortega, perfeotly acquainted with the sociologists of his time, 
set out to write this general treatise, because he believed he 
could contribute something new. However, such a pDrpose seems 
to be ambitious and far above his aocomplianment. We heard him 
laling: 
r shall never forget the surprise mingled with shame 
and shock whioh I felt when, many years ago, conscious 
127 
of m:r ignoranoe on this subject. I hurried, full of 
illusion, all the sails of hope spread wide, to books 
on sooiology ••• and fo,und something incredible--namely 
that books on sooiology have nothing clear to saya-
bout what the social is, about what sooiety is. l 
Cert4inly ~ ~ people does not,d1tter too much, presoind-
lng from its literary form, from Dlrkheim t s Rules ~ .:?ociological 
Method or from ~~bert s Theorz £! 100ial ~ .&oonomic, Organization. 
Durkheim, for instano-3, oonsiderssocial facts as independent fro 
individual aotivities: "Here, then, is a cat6gory of facts with 
very distinctive oharaoteristios: it oonsists in ways of acting, 
thinking, and feeling external to the individual, and endowed wit 
a power of coercion, by reason of which they -control him." 3 And 
Ortega writes: "To judge from what appears hCtre, usages are not 
of the Indlv1.dual but or sooiety."4 From the two ohar"oterist,iotl 
of sooial f~ot s in Durkheim, namely, their ooeroion IUld diffusion, 
Ortega stre:ssew mainly the former and identifies it with the in-
stitutiOnalization of physioal force: the government. This ident-
lOrtega, ~ ~ People, p. 13. 
2Emi1e Durkheim, The Rules of Sociologioal Method, Tranalated 
by So10vary and Mue11.F\New YOl'K; 1958) Max weber, The Theory ot 
Soolal and Eoonomio Organization4 Translated by Henderson and Par. 
sons (New York, 1947).· 
3nurkheim. ~ Rules of Soctiog1c~1.Method, p. 3. 
40rtega, ~ !2£ People, p. 194. 
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ifioation of physical force with the government is Ortega's syn-
thesis of Durkheim and weber. 5 
Ortegats three levels of human action--the personal, the in-
terpersonal, and the social--make him even more of an exaggerated 
realist than Durkheim. 6 In spite of the fact that the subjeot 
matter of sociology should be human interaction and therefore 
ought !jOt. to be liuited to the study of mores and customs (usages 
still the three levels of analysis of Ortega are useful oategorie 
for social psyohology. Follow,"ng r:urkh,e~.m, 0rtega Idsntified soc 
iology w~~h socI&l psyohology to a great extent. The three level 
of human action of Ortega, as we said before, are abstraotions. 
Parti-cularily important among them is his portrait of usages. Us-
age. correspond very much to what Malinowski oalled the dead ele-
--
~, and Summer called folkwals.7 If we make the subject matter 
of sociology oonsist of any type of human interaotion, Ortega~8 
I 
charaoterization of the interpersonal level oontains a good ex-
position of the mllt",:". notos of the' sociologioal unit. Human inter 
. 5Weber, From Max Weber, Translated and edited by 3erth and 
Mills (New Yo~~), p. 159. 
6Timashetf, sociologioal Theorl, p. 117. 
7Bronislaw Malinowski, Scientifio The0
rk of Culture (New Yor 1944), p.-46; and, Summer, FOlkWays (Rew to  ,-r906). 
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aotion, Ortega's oharaoterization of the interpersonal level oon-
tains a good exposition of the main notes of the so01010gioal unitt 
Human interaotion, then, aooording to our writer, is meaningfUl, 
involves reciprocity, oontingency, 8.nd interpraation. 8 Reoiproclt~ 
in so far as interaotion implies always another subjeot or point OJ -
referenoe different from mine~ Until the Other Man appears on the 
scene as ."havepointed out before, the here and 'Chere were Ublvo-
-
cal, now they beoome equivoo.l~9 Contingenoy beoause the reaotlon 
01"' tht'! OthE:Jr Man is unpredictable; and this is the reason for us-
ages; to p~oteot us from our mutual foreignels and unpredloabl11ty· 
Interpretation, inasmuch as the Other Man is an intus and we can-
not reaoh him direotly but only through his manifestations. Body 
and intelleot play an important role in this interpretation of the 
Other Man. The former gives us something whioh the latter has to 
interpret. Ortega y GasBet holds that thought is purely instrumen-
tal and subordinated to the biologioal level, as we said before. 
To a great extent, this instrumentality of thought is a philosophi-
cal postulste neoessary for the sooial approach to thought and for 
the ideational approaoh to oulture, both of which aspeots are treat", 
ed at length in Ortega'. sociology. However. we cannot agree with 
80beerve the similarity with Weber's meaningful action and 
oausality, The Theory of Soaial and Economic Organization (New Yor} 
1947), pp. '87=124. -
9pp • 31-32. 
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the exagS"eration wi th which Ortega expl~in s the instrumentality o~ 
intellect. As in many other instances, this is one of Ortega's 
postulates derived from his philosophy which was heavily in~lu­
enced by the biological findings of his time. ~th regard to such 
postulates and philosophical position one commentor says: "With 
regard to the problem of how to emphasize in a correct way the 
lm.jJortance of life as oPP9sed to the biological expre ssions of 
Ortega could. give greater strength to his arguments than the on-
t;(,logical a.nd epistemological postulates. We do not know which 
,wa's the specific goal of ortega. But there is no doubt that he 
could not aocep~ a biological interpretation of reason." lO Another 
commentsc "His thought seems to ••• adopt expressions openly realis-
tlc ••• Reason. subordinated to life, composes poetry to life. Pure 
reason leaves its'plaoe to vital reason ••• His contempt for con-
ceptualizatlons makes him hesitate in front of the threats of re-
lativism."ll The same difference of interpretation regarding his 
philosophical position appears in all other oommentaries of Orteg 
The concept of culture of ortega oorresponds to what Weber 
called civillza.tion.l2 Ortega's disregard for invention, an.d in 
ge~eralt for any type of non-formal oultural activity restriots 
his concept of culture to ideological products. However, we tind 
lOperrater Mora, ~ filosofia ~ Ortega I Gasset, pp. 39-40. 
llJoae Sanohez Villasenor, ~ Ortega Z Gassett p. 74. 
l2Robert Merton, "Civilization and Culture,tt sooiologl and 
Social Research (~93b), pp. 104, 109. ---
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ver,y similar definitions of oulture among the old anthropologistst 
Ortega's expositions of the origin of oulture and its connection 
with usages are penetrating and rioh; they express in a definitiv 
fashion what ocoupies entire .works of anthropology. We have part 
ioularly in mind a number of good observations about human behavi 
or,14 and about sooial elements. ttTeohnique, 1t says Ortega, "i. th 
adaptation of the environment to the individual instead of the in 
dividual to the environment.,,15 And we say how this simple observ 
ation is what distinguishes animal from human behavior. The con-
ception of man as an organism which, even i~tellectu.lly, needs 
the stimuli of the world around him, as something that belongs to 
the very nature of this organism is also stressed by Toynbee.16 
If we rid all thesen oonceptions of their possibly false philoso-
phical postulates, they can reorientate our research in social 
p.,.chology. 
Ortega unites the units of the different 30cial soienoes wit 
too muoh readiness. Bowever, his general soheme o~ sooial, cul-
tural, and political aotion offers the possibility of an organlza 
tion of theories and findings in these different fields. Ortega' 
13"culture or civilization ••• is that oomplex whole which in-
cludes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, oustom and any other 
capabili ties and habits acquired by ma.n as a member of sooiety," 
Mor~an, Primitive Culture, from Timasheff, Sociological Theo~, 
p. 49. SimIlarly, p. 67. 
14we refer to the distinction bet.een man and animal behavio 
for instance, a theme that Malinowski explains in a very similar 
way. Malinowski, Soientific Theory of culture, (New York,1944)p. 
{t,0rtega, Obras Com leiiaa, V, (1955), p. 326. 
ologists: f! filoaofia .2!. Ortega 1. Gasset, p. 45. 
grand theory, whether to reject or acoept, should be conaid.red 
aa the product ot 8. deep understanding o( soclal phenomena. Thls 
1. Dot on17 oorroboratjd b7 the impre.aioll whioh hi. wr1 tings oau •• 
ed at the time, but m.'u17 b7 the aooura07of the prediotions ot 
Ortega. Most of the problema which o~r aooial soene oontaina 'oda7 
were envisaged at the beginning ot ta. oenttlQ' by orte'p..17 
Importance should be siv.n to the historical studies ot Ort •• 
gas, and espeolal,ly to what we have dalled ti.4& histor1eal rh7tblna. 
Hls ideological an4 oultural approaoh to bia.torlcal taota i. part!-
cul.rly relevant in suoh areas of researoh as war, law, 800ial 
movementa, etc. The h1storical so0101087 ot Orb ega could otter 
enough subjeot .atter to anyone intere.ted in writing 8. m.onogx-aph. 
Care should be taken, however, that we pre,oind tram 8. a~at v •• ~ 
of merely liteztary or philosophical digr.8s10ns_ Ort.ga f. dootrine 
ot the point of vi ... Is similar to the relatlonlsm of Mannheim, aile 
a.ema to be a oonsequenoe of his historiola=_ All these problema 
should be treated more extensively beoaus. they touch i...."on the dtt .. 
fleu1t pro.l .. ot the oonfliot b.t .... n aociol08' •• 1 and philosophi-
oal commitments. M&DDhelmt a ES_Z! lathe SocIo!~!!! 1"011'1.4,.,. 
and stt'lrlr't. 80c10lo8'1 ot .Knowledge treat this problem at lenstll. an~ 
with depth.18 
p. 71:7Marla.,. ,hilo.ophel' espagnolee ~ notre tess (Paris, 1954), 
18stark, Th~ socIology 2.!. I'no;-l.dje q.on4on, 1958) pp. 16~ ~,~annheim, Essays on tne 80Cloloc;y 01 knowledGe, /r'anslated 
by Pauls l'~ecsker.'~eti (LODCOi.1;-l"959) p. 27b. 
l~~ 
The main thesis of Ortega'a political sooioloty is his oon-
ception of political facta as mer~ reflection of social structure 
It is interesting to notice how Tocqueville, whose work 
the most olassical pol1tical werks, places the cause of many pol! 
tical realitIes in the po11t1cal institutions and political atti-
tudes of the people. We do not mean to 8AY that Tocquevllle'a the 
orr is not perfectly valid within aome limits or determinate lev-
el of explanation. But a more profound underst~di~g can be a-
quir~d by oorrelating soci~l institutions and attitudes with pol-
itical facts. Ortega gives us a key for this type of approach to 
po~ical phenomena. l 9 Merton's manifest and latent funotions can 
help us to better grasp Ortega's idea of the role of beliefs and 
ideas; of the nature of the common plan that oonstitutes the na-
tion, and the role of the minority in society.20 The functional 
appro-stem would try to verify ju~t how much these sooial dogmas 
, 
are the real independent variables of cultural and p01tlcal oh 
or .ather mere rationalizations of deeper factors. As we pointed 
out before, Ortega is an ideological determinist.21 ~. 80oiolo-
gi st s in thi s country tend to take .the opPolli te approach: "III 
studying the ideas in sooial movements,.. shall' take them all 
190rtega t S Revolt of the Masses expresses l:l0.~·~ of the c,.,nt:-a 
ideas of Tooquevil1e .bout~e strong desire for equality in Amer 
ioa. Tocquevil1e. 
2oMerton, Social Theory ~ Sooial structure (Glenooe, 1959) 
p. 19.·. 
2 
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proolamations of aims and as expressions of will. r~ther than •• 
statements of economic or political truth, n says Heberle .22 HowEI'VIr 
Orte":s. eave to the term idea a very wide sense. In hie studies a-
bout teohnlc1Jl p:rogreE'~: fnr 1nstance, he presents the biological 
nee1$ ~s Recondary with regard to their intelleotual justification. 
H.writes: ftMan does not want to die, on the oontrary he wants to 
survive ••• but why does man ""'ant to survive instead of' ceasing to 
exist?" 23 He says that the instinct of conservation is not a good 
explanation because many people ch~ose death sometimes. The result 
of all this is the basic-----. 
Ortega y Gasset simplif'led too much his social approach to pol 
it:!.cal phenomena by making the state identical with the nation, or 
SOCiety. Sooiety and state are different eveqkhough one might not 
exist without the other. Furthermore, there is a laok of termino-
logy to distinguish Government from ~tate when necessary. Inthe 
coUrse of our exposition we tried to avoid such terminology beoause 
our author never bothered about t~is problem. 
A good resutt of Ortega's cultural approaoh to politioal fao'. 
is his study of the Revolt of the MassElS. Leaving aside the numer-
--- - - ---.;;;.. 
ous rhetorical and literary expressions of this work, we must ao-
knowledge the inrluence thAt it has had upon contemporary political 
~henomena, especially in reference to political ideologies. All 
22Heberel, Soolal Movement, Appleton, century Crofts, p. 12. 
23Ortega, Obras Completas V (Madrid, 1955), 3-82. 
135 
All theee studies are of great importance in our world of politi-
cal and ideological struggle. Riesman's Lonely Crowd is very sim 
ilar in approach to the political works of Ortega and offers a 
great deal of parallel points with the former. 25 The general char 
acter of the revolt of the masses is treated in Riesman, and the 
other-directed and ~nslde dopester have more than one similarity 
, 26 
W1th Ortega's "'ss-man. 
Ortega's definition of nation as a dynamic reality is especi-
ally relevant from a sociological point of view. Such a theory 
oan be dynamios and social ohange and deviance. 27 
Finally Ortega, by carrylng man.,. ot his ideas about myth and 
~d.ol~gi.s into the realm of pol1tlo.l sociology, of tel's us a typ 
of weltanschauung of our age that,a.cording to Mannhelm should be 
the maIn aIm of the solology of knowledge. Mannhelm went '0 far 
a, to state, tho 1,mpos~ibllfty eft' pol! tical science without the 
" ~; 
I preliminary bases ot the sociology of knowledge.28 
;;4,: 
WIth regard to Ortegats sociology of knowledge, it is signi-
ficant that most of his sources are identical with those of Mann-
helm. Ortega t s' oate,orles, in this field of sociology, show a 
sociological interest, rather than a phil •• ophioal one. we have 
pointed out this faot before, when we were dealing with the dis-
25navid Rieeman, !2! Lonell Crowd (New York, 1953). 
26Ibid., PP. ;4, 191-260. 
27Here we have mainly in mind the works already mentioned be-
fore, ~ ,Sorokin, ~arsons, and Merton. 
tinction o£ Mannheim between ideology and utopia and Ortega's be-
liefs and ideas. 
Ortega's terminology, ho\~ver, is marksdly subjective, and 
re£lects a great deal o£ his anti-religio •• feelings. The terms 
revelation, faith, belief, when applied to social phenomena are 
not only inadequate but they indicate bad tast •• 29 
However, i' we do not p~ too mpch attention to the termino-
lo~e.l aspeot, the facts expressed by Ortega's terminology and 
their hierarchical organization are to b. considered. Perhaps to 
many, Ortega might appear too theoretical and even vague; but suCh 
an accusation could as well be directed to the sociology of know-
leQge. »ow we have written a few pages trying to present our views 
in regard to such an accuaation. 
In spite of his philosophical commitments, Ortega's studies 
of beliefs and ideas, of sooial doubts, social reorientation and 
change, are based on a great deal of historical research. Mannhei~ 
gave us tllB general theory of' the relationship of political ideo-
logie. and parties to 800ial group. and classes. Ortega foouse. 
his sociology of knowledge around the problem of ideologioal cha~ 
Decadenoe, progress, and sensibility of' an age are explained in 
terms of' the change of ideas into beliets and vice versa. Here, 
we must insist once more, the hypothetical character of this field 
290n November 24, 1950, Ortega made this announcement 'in a 
public theatre: "r announce that the Catholic Church is going to 
get rid of Aristotle and ~. Thomas and that a new ~heo16gy will be Quilt in connection with the Holy ~athers."Granerol~Ortega y Gasset 
en al cine Barcelo," Raxon y Fe, CXLI llqi)Ol i8q~ 
of sociology permeates Ortega's Ideas and Beliefs. 
Finally Ortega t s theory of art as portRait in his f.! deshumall 
izacion del arte, must, one we get rid of his applications to mod-
------
ern art, constitute a well for further research and theory in thi~ 
new field of knowledge. Although some art critics have shown lit-
tle sympathy for the criticism of modern art of ortega. yet, im-
plicitely in this work of Ortega, we find all the sociological 
bases for a sociology of art. 
ortega's great qualities as an art critic and his sooio-his-
tori cal knowledge help him to understand the social nature of art. 
As far a~ critioism goes, we sho~ consider the literary form of 
his essay, 1! deshumanizacion ~ artei the paradoxes and exagger-
ated statements of this work have to be understood in the lIght of 
our introduotion. Aranguren, a great disciple of Ortega writeal"It 
is fairly known that Ortega evaluatia very much the exaggeration 
because of its expressiveness and ostantation, and, so to speak, 
its pedagogio power. n30 
~hat is more diffioult to reconsile, is a contradiction that 
seems to lie beneath the whole interpretation of modern art when 
it is judged on the basis, of Ortega.s general sociology of know-
iedge. Ortega claims that knowledge, within a sooiologioal oon-
text, is partioularly oreative in art and science. From this poin 
. 3OJose Luis de Aranguren, f!!. Et10a ~ Ortega, Taurus, (Madrid. 
1958) J p. 19. 
of view, the essay of Ortega about modern art, should be prior, 
logically at least, to his Revolt of the Masses. But we know that 
------ -- --- ------
not only the main ideas of the former essay were formulated after 
the ~evolt £f ~ Masses, but also thst his sociological interpret 
ation of modern art implies, as an ~ prior scheme, his political 
and social outlook to the mass-movements of our age. If the 800io-
cultural views of any age can and should be discovered, in the 
first place, :1.n art ano science, Ortega.'s Deshumanizacion del arte 
--
should be prior to his political work. This seems to prove that 
Ortegats interpretation of modern art is biased by his sooial out-
look to modern times. 
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